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This Article introduces a novel legal paradigm—customer
domination at work—to address the sexual harassment of employees
by customers. This new approach challenges the prevailing para-
digm, which focuses on the employer-employee binary relationship. I
show how, under current Title VII law, the prevailing paradigm
leads to a weaker form of employer liability than other instances
where employers are liable for the sexual harassment of their employ-
ees. The protection for workers is also limited. The same is true of
two other legal regimes discussed in the Article: Germany and Brit-
ain. More importantly, I argue that the prevailing paradigm pre-
cludes a true understanding of the problem of third-party
harassment that recognizes the power of customers within an em-
ployer-employee-customer triangular relationship, seeing the cus-
tomer as integral to the organization of work. Within the triangular
relationship, customer domination at work is created, consisting of
three aspects: masculinity, authority, and service market power. Cus-
tomer domination is shaped and reinforced by employers, and is ex-
ploited by customers in these cases of harassment. This should lead, I
claim, to placing stricter legal liability on employers, incentivizing
them to change workplace practices that provide customers with such
power, and to customers bearing legal responsibility that parallels
employer liability.
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INTRODUCTION
In the past few centuries, services have become a main characteristic of
economies in most Western countries.1 Within service economies, custom-
ers are integrated into the organization of work. This creates what has been
termed in academic literature “a triangular work relationship,” consisting of
an employer, an employee, and a customer.2 Research has revealed how the
1. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY POLICY FORUM
SERIES: THE SERVICE ECONOMY, 4, 10, 13 (2000). According to OECD, manufac-
turing has been slipping to less than 20% of GDP, while services have risen to more
than 70%, in some OECD countries. Id. at 3.
2. I offered the term “a worker-employer-customer triangle” in a previous piece of
work. See Einat Albin, A Worker-Employer-Customer Triangle: The Case of Tips, 40
INDUS. L.J. 181 (2011). Other studies have also pointed to the interrelations of all
three parties. See, e.g., ROBIN LEIDNER, FAST FOOD, FAST TALK: SERVICE WORK
AND THE ROUTINIZATION OF EVERYDAY LIFE 1, 7, 125–77 (1993) (explaining “in-
teractive service work” as a term that describes “jobs that require workers to interact
directly with customers and clients” and where employees have to deal with both
their employer’s demands as well as those of customers); Linda McDowell, Adina
Batnitzky & Sara Dyer, Division, Segmentation, and Interpellation: The Embodied La-
bors of Migrant Workers in a Great London Hotel, 83 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 1, 3 (2007)
2017] C U S T O M E R  D O M I N A T I O N  A T  W O R K 169
varied interests of the three parties shape power relations in a variety of work
relationships, emphasizing the power of customers.3 The power of custom-
ers and their interrelations with employers and employees within the trian-
gular relationship has not entered, however, into legal thought, even though
it can substantially shift existing legal paradigms. This is very much evident
in relation to the paradigm of sexual harassment of employees by customers,
as argued in this Article.
In the United States, employer liability for third-party sexual harass-
ment (including customers) has been established, noted as the start of a
sexual harassment revolution4 and as a third wave of sexual harassment liti-
gation and scholarship.5 Employer liability for third-party harassment aims
to address one of the most troubling forms of sexual harassment at work.
Numerous studies have shown that the sexual harassment of employees by
third parties is destabilizing and traumatizing for women.6 Some have ar-
gued that it might be even more disturbing than other types of harassment
in the workplace.7 This type of harassment is a barrier to women’s advance-
(discussing interpellation as a dual process that involves the interrelationship of em-
ployees, employers, co-workers and customers in the context of a hotel).
3. See Albin, supra note 2, at 181–85. See also Linda Fuller & Vicki Smith, Consumers’
Reports: Management by Customers in a Changing Economy, 5 WORK, EMP’T & SOC’Y
1, 5–8 (1991) (looking into the ways in which employers use customers to monitor,
evaluate, and assess workers in services).
4. See Amy Mathews, The Sexual Harassment Revolution: Employer Liability for Third
Party Sexual Harassment, 65 UMKC L. REV. 977, 977 (1997).
5. Lea B. Vaughn, The Customer is Always Right . . . Not! Employer Liability for Third
Party Sexual Harassment, 9 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 2–3 (2002). The first wave of
sexual harassment litigation was recognition of sexual harassment as a form of sex
discrimination, and the second wave was the acknowledgement of a hostile work-
place. Id. at 3 n.6. See also Robert J. Aalberts & Lorne H. Seidman, Sexual Harass-
ment by Clients, Customers and Suppliers: How Employers Should Handle an Emerging
Legal Problem, 20 EMP. REL. L.J. 85, 85–86 (1994) (noting that employer liability
for sexual harassment is an emerging body of law to which managers should be
alert).
6. Vaughn, supra note 5, at 3–4, 6. See infra notes 8–16 and accompanying text.
7. Aalberts and Seidman wrote that the impact of third-party harassment on a victim
might be greater than the impact of harassment by a fellow employee because much
of it occurs outside the traditional office or factory. Robert J. Aalberts & Lorne H.
Seidman, Sexual Harassment of Employees by Non-Employees: When Does the Employer
Become Liable?, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 447, 449 (1994). This makes harassment less visi-
ble and, therefore, less easily prevented. Id. As a consequence, female professionals
and sales representatives, who often must meet on their customers’ premises or in
restaurants and drinking establishments to conduct business, become more vulnera-
ble targets. Id.
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ment and success.8 It may also affect their job satisfaction and health, as it
has been shown that women who have endured harassment “experience
more psychological stress, feel less attached to their organizations, and spend
more time thinking about quitting.”9 Studies have also shown that harass-
ment by third parties crosses sectors, affecting lawyers,10 nurses,11 wait-
resses,12 bartenders,13 accountants,14 salespersons,15 hotel employees,16 and
workers in many other occupations.17
8. Hilary J. Gettman & Michele J. Gelfand, When the Customer Shouldn’t Be King:
Antecedents and Consequences of Sexual Harassment by Clients and Customers, 92 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 757, 768 (2007).
9. Id. at 765.
10. Peter Jan Honigsberg et al., When the Client Harasses the Attorney: Recognizing Third
Party Sexual Harassment in the Legal Profession, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 715 (1994); Alan
Deutschman & Sara Hammes, Dealing with Sexual Harassment, FORTUNE, Nov.
1991, at 145. The Prentice Hall Law & Business Survey of Women Litigators from
1993 revealed that 44.9% of all women attorneys surveyed reported they had been
harassed by clients during the past five years. J. Stratton Shartel, Female Litigators
Report, Discrimination by Clients Limits Opportunities, INSIDE LITIGATION, Feb.
1993, at 1, 20; Debra Baker, Plague in the Profession: Success in The Legal World Is No
Safeguard Against Sexual Harassment, 86 A.B.A. J. 40 (2000).
11. See Kay M. Libbus & Katherine Bowman, Sexual Harassment of Female Registered
Nurses in Hospitals, 24 J. NURSING ADMIN. 26 (1994); Tammy Mcguire et al.,
“Paradoxing the Dialectic”: The Impact of Patients’ Sexual Harassment in the Discursive
Construction of Nurses’ Caregiving Roles, 19 MGMT. COMMC’N Q. 416 (2006).
12. See Elaine J. Hall, Smiling, Deferring, and Flirting: Doing Gender by Giving “Good
Service”, 20 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 452 (1993); Yvonne Guerrier & Amel S. Adib,
“No, We Don’t Provide that Service”: The Harassment of Hotel Employees by Customers,
14 WORK, EMP’T, & SOC’Y 689 (2000); Karla Erickson, Bodies at Work: Performing
Service in American Restaurants, 7 SPACE & CULTURE 76 (2004); Kaitlyn Matule-
wicz, Law and the Construction of Institutionalized Sexual Harassment in Restaurants,
30 CAN. J. L. & SOC’Y 401 (2015).
13. See Anonymous, How I Feel As a Bar Waitress When You Sexually Harass Me,
MUNCHIES, Aug. 30, 2016, https://munchies.vice.com/en/articles/how-i-feel-when-
you-sexually-harass-me-as-your-bar-waitress.
14. See Gerald J. Miller et al., Sexual Harassment and Public Accounting: Anecdotal Evi-
dence from the Profession, 5 J. DIVERSITY MGMT. 7, 12 (2010).
15. See Leslie M. Fine et al., Sexual Harassment in the Sales Force: The Customer Is Not
Always Right, 14 J. PERS. SELLING & SALES MGMT. 15 (1994); Leslie M. Fine et al.,
Insights into Sexual Harassment of Salespeople by Customers: The Role of Gender and
Customer Power, 19 J. PERS. SELLING & SALES MGMT. 19 (1999).
16. See Dan Gilbert et al., Sexual Harassment Issues in the Hospitality Industry, 10 INT’L J.
CONTEMP. HOSPITALITY MGMT. 48 (1998); Ingebjørg S. Folgerø & Ingrid H.
Fjeldstad, On Duty—Off Guard: Cultural Norms and Sexual Harassment in Service
Organizations, 16 ORG. STUD. 299 (1995); Guerrier & Adib, supra note 12.
17. See Gettman & Gelfand, supra note 8, at 763, 766. Gettman and Gelfand conducted
two studies on the sexual harassment of working women by customers. The first
addresses professional women and the second addresses women in the retail industry
working in a large grocery store chain. They found that 86% of the professional
women who participated in their study had experienced sexist hostility: 67% sexual
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Yet, I argue in this Article that the achievements of this third wave of
sexual harassment regulation and litigation have been limited. The prevail-
ing legal paradigm has, in many cases of such harassment, led to a weaker
form of liability that provides limited protection to employees suffering
from harassment. It also increases women employees’ subordination in the
market. In the U.S., as well as in other countries such as Germany and
Britain (discussed herein at length), liability in cases of sexual harassment by
customers has been placed on employers, based on a view of the employ-
ment relationship as binary. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act declares that
“[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex.”18 Once
liability for sexual harassment at work is bound to the employer-employee
binary, employer liability for third-party harassment seems apparent. A re-
view of the literature on the sexual harassment of employees by third parties
shows that almost all scholars have rooted their arguments in this existing
paradigm.19
By challenging this existing paradigm the Article offers a novel theo-
retical and practical legal approach to third-party sexual harassment—cus-
tomer domination at work. This new paradigm shifts the focus to customer
domination, offering an understanding of the power customers have within
employment; a power that serves as a setting for their acts of sexual harass-
ment. Customer domination is built within an employer-employee-customer
triangular relationship. Therefore the proposed paradigm also emphasizes
the role that employers have in shaping the power of these dominating cus-
tomers. This paradigm justifies the placing of stricter liability on employers
when their workplace practices provide customers with dominating power,
incentivizing employers to re-shape such practices. It also justifies placing
specific liability on customers.
hostility, 40% reported unwanted sexual attention, and 8% sexual coercion. They
also compared harassment rates based on age, race, industry, job tenure, and self-
employment status. According to their findings, there were no significant differences
in the frequency of harassment based on industry, age, or tenure in current position,
though differences were found based on race, with non-white participants experienc-
ing more harassment than white participants. A total of 394 women participated in
the study, with the participants’ ages ranging from 23 to 70. They worked in a
variety of professions, including law, human resources consulting, medical technol-
ogy consulting, sales, business, and political action. In their second survey, 3445
women responded, reporting that they also experience harassment by customers to a
large extent. Id.
18. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-51).
19. See infra Part I.
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The nearly non-existent legal scholarship on the role of customers in
situations of harassment is, on the one hand, surprising. Given that the
rapidly growing service economy requires employees to deal directly with
customers on a daily basis, one would expect the law to address these third
parties.20 Obviously, under state law, criminal claims can be brought (when
appropriate) against customers for harassing workers, or civil claims can be
brought for emotional stress and other harms. However, this does not lead
to recognition of the important phenomenon of customer domination at
work as proposed in this Article. On the other hand, though, lack of recog-
nition of customer domination is in line with current legal perceptions, for
disregard of customer domination is not unusual in the law. Such disregard
aligns with the focus placed on the employer-employee binary that sees the
customer as external, and with the perceived legal view of customers as gen-
erally vulnerable and deserving of legal protection, which is the story told to
us by consumer protection laws. What emerges is a highly problematic para-
digm that values customers over workers, particularly women workers. This
paradigm has become a precondition of an ungendered legal regime, and
consequently, of the economic regime.
By offering a novel theory of customer domination at work, this Arti-
cle presents three sub-arguments. First, the Article provides an understand-
ing of customer domination by pointing to three aspects building such
domination: masculinity, authority, and service market power. It leans on gen-
der literature to reflect on the masculinity of customers in relation to women
employees; it builds on literature about bureaucracy in work relations to
show how customers have authority over employees and on service literature
to expose what I call service market power. In parallel with traditional em-
ployers, customers are performing various employment functions, such as
paying salaries through the provision of tips or other gratuities, impacting
decisions about hiring and firing, and determining work time. Masculinity,
consumer culture, and the monetary capital of customers (which places
20. This type of interaction is what Leidner terms “interactive service work”. LEIDNER,
supra note 2, at 1. See also Anat Rafaeli, When Cashiers Meet Customers: An Analysis of
the Role of Supermarket Cashiers, 32 ACAD. MGMT. J. 245 (1989) (discussing the
“service encounter” of supermarket cashiers with customers, among other parties);
JOHN R. BRYSON ET AL., SERVICE WORLDS: PEOPLE, ORGANIZATIONS, TECHNOLO-
GIES 109–29  (2004) (addressing the involvement of customers in work relations);
Einat Albin, Labour Law in a Service World, 73 MOD. L. REV. 959 (2010) (where I
argued that in service work customers are an integral part of work relationships and
that therefore employment law should consider applying legal responsibilities to
these customers along “a nexus of service work” that is offered in that article); Naomi
Schoenbaum, The Law of Intimate Work, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1167 (2015) (using the
term “intimate work” to address the “paid provision of services entailing intimacy to
a range of customers,” and discussing the potentials and pitfalls of such work).
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them in a powerful position within the organizational hierarchy), combined
with the view that a customer should receive “service with a smile” from a
docile and appealing worker, allows customers to dominate the employees
who provide them with services. Such domination is highly evident from
the descriptions of employees provided in numerous academic studies on
customer harassment, as well as from the situations discussed in detail in
court decisions.
Second, the Article shows that an analysis of masculinity, authority
and service market power reveals that customer domination is tightly en-
twined within employment relations, and, more specifically, that an em-
ployer-employee-customer triangular exists.21 This triangular view of the
relationship leads to customers being seen as integral to the workplace and
to employment, not external to it as the focus on the employer-employee
binary leads us to think. I will show how employers shape their businesses in
a way that is aimed to please customers, and in the process, transfer their
employer functions to these customers. Customers partake in these employ-
ment practices, exploiting at times the power they receive, with the law
protecting their interests and biases. In many ways customers are more in-
ternal to the business than are employees.
Third, the varied ways in which customer power is shaped should urge
us to recognize the significance of customer domination, and at times to
place specific and rigid liability on dominating customers when they sexu-
ally harass workers alongside the liability placed on employers. In some cir-
cumstances, it should also bring the law to place stricter liability on
employers. Viewing customers as integral to the work organization justifies
taking both steps, as does examining the social and legal shortcomings of
the current legal approach. The social problems are weak protection of
women employees and exacerbation of their subordination. The legal
problems are that, first, under the prevailing paradigm, equality doctrines
that are currently being applied in other cases of sexual harassment under
Title VII are distorted. These are the doctrines of disparate treatment and
disparate impact,22 and their distortion is a result of viewing the customer as
external to the organization. The second legal problem is that the focus on
21. See infra Part IV.
22. The most common formulation of disparate treatment is the treatment of a person
“in a manner which but for that person’s [sex or other protected class membership]
would be different.” See Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers,
Accommodation, and the Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1374–75
(2009) (citations omitted). Disparate impact differs from disparate treatment in that
it does not require discriminatory intent, and it does not analyze causation at an
individual level at all but instead requires that the challenged employer practice harm
a group defined by a protected trait. Id. at 1382–83.
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the employer-employee binary obstructs our understanding of third-party
domination in work relationships in today’s societies, especially when the
third party is a customer. In other words, the focus on the binary obstructs
the law’s understanding of customer domination at work.
While current law sets the legal basis for placing stricter legal liability
on employers, the establishment of parallel liability on customers is more
challenging. I suggest two ways to address this challenge. The first is by
acknowledging customer domination as creating particular legal liability
under Title VII. The second is by interpreting the notion of “employers” in
Title VII and state laws to include customers, while applying the joint em-
ployer doctrine. This is relevant only when there is close proximity between
the customer and the employee.
These proposals are offered with the goal of furthering what Robin
West has called “reconstructive feminist jurisprudence,” which means “re-
construct[ing] the reforms necessary to the safety and improvement of
women’s lives in direct language that is true to our own experience and our
own subjective lives.”23 Indeed, adopting the proposed paradigm of customer
domination at work would help achieve West’s goal. It is now time to take
this step.24
The Article is structured as follows: Part I introduces the prevailing
legal paradigm in the U.S., which focuses on employer liability in cases of
third-party sexual harassment through the employer-employee binary prism.
Part II analyzes two additional legal systems—those of Germany and Brit-
ain. Part III aims to understand the prevailing paradigm for addressing cus-
tomer harassment of employees, examining the strengths and shortcomings
of the current approach. Part IV proposes the theory of customer domina-
tion at work, while Part V discusses the proposals to address the shortcom-
ings of the existing paradigm. Part VI concludes.
23. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 70 (1988).
24. Significantly, this Article does not enter into the debate on whether sexual harass-
ment norms in the workplace are good or bad, whether they portray feminists as
anti-sex, as moralists, and as people who see sex at work as contaminating the work-
place while trying to sanitize it from flirtation and eroticism or to promote sexual
correctness. See Susanne Baer, Dignity or Equality? Responses to Workplace Harassment
in European, German and U.S. Law, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW
582 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2003), and KATHRIN S. ZIP-
PEL, THE POLITICS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE
UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND GERMANY (2006), for a discussion of
those topics. Rather, this Article uses the example of sexual harassment of workers by
customers to shed light on the neglect of customer domination, noting that if sexual
harassment at work is seen as an issue of gender equality and of women’s rights, then
neglecting customer domination is problematic.
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I. EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF
WORKERS BY CUSTOMERS
U.S. law places legal liability on employers in cases of third-party har-
assment, including harassment by customers. The liability of employers for
customer sexual harassment was established in the 1993 Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines, and was later adopted in the
Code of Federal Regulations.25 The regulations note that “[a]n employer
may also be responsible for the acts of non-employees, with respect to sexual
harassment of employees in the workplace, where the employer (or its agents
or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct and
fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.”26 This protection
is built upon the recognition of sexual harassment as a discriminatory issue,
as declared in 1980 by the EEOC when it acknowledged sexual harassment
to be a violation of Section 703 of Title VII.
On this basis, the EEOC established criteria for determining when
unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature constitutes sexual harassment, de-
fined the circumstances under which an employer may be held liable, and
suggested affirmative steps an employer should take to prevent sexual harass-
ment.27 The EEOC regulations supplement the Supreme Court cases Mer-
itor Savings Bank v. Vinson28 and Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.29 Together, these
sources expressly acknowledge that sexual harassment is unwelcome conduct
that either affects a tangible job benefit or renders the work environment
“hostile,” and that both types of harassment can be committed not only by
a supervisor or co-worker but also by a third party. The Supreme Court
stated that sexual harassment can affect job performance, discourage em-
ployees from remaining in their jobs, and keep them from advancing in
their careers, and that it therefore undermines the protection of “sexual
equality in the workplace” under Title VII.30
As noted above, the EEOC regulations place responsibilities on em-
ployers in cases of customer sexual harassment when the employer knows or
should have known of the harassment, and when the employer fails to take
immediate and appropriate corrective action.31 The regulations also consider
25. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC N-915-050, Policy Guidance
on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment (1990) [hereinafter EEOC Regulations]; 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11 (Westlaw through 2017).
26. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (Westlaw through 2017).
27. See 29 C.F. R. § 1604.11 (Westlaw through 2017).
28. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
29. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
30. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (citing Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir.
1982)).
31. EEOC Regulations, supra note 25.
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the extent of the employer’s control and any other legal responsibility that
the employer may have with respect to the conduct of such non-employ-
ees.32 If the employer takes reasonable steps to address the harassment, he is
not liable, nor is he liable when the complainant has not shown that the
harassment was severe.33 Additionally, if the employer has a clear policy
against sexual harassment and no control over the act of harassment, the
employer will not be held responsible for it.34
Numerous court decisions have addressed these regulations while de-
veloping legal requirements, with two types of situations generally underly-
ing the legal discourse. The first type of situations addressing employer
responsibility for third-party harassment are those where employees were
required to act or present themselves in sexual ways at work, such as by
flirting with customers or wearing specific clothing, which subjected them
to harassment by customers. Here, two sub-types of cases have been at the
center of discussions. In the first sub-type, employers required their employ-
ees to act in a sexual manner towards customers, even when the business
itself was not of a sexual nature at all; in the second sub-type, the dress code
and activities were sexual because the business was built on the commodifi-
cation of female sexuality.35 While the first sub-type of cases is relatively
easy to address, due to direct employer liability in creating a sexualized work
environment, the second is more complicated, given that some argue that
employees have willingly entered a type of work environment that builds on
32. Id.
33. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (developing the requirement that harassment be severe);
Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995) (same); Little v.
Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 968 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying the
severity requirement). See also EEOC Regulations, supra note 25.
34. EEOC Regulations, supra note 25.
35. I look at these as two types of situations, although others have proposed alternative
ways to look at and divide U.S. case law on this subject. Kelly and Sinclair, for
example, divide U.S. cases into three categories: the first category consists of situa-
tions where the employer asked the employee to perform in a certain sexual manner
towards the customer, making it easy to see how the court finds the employer liable
for the harassment; the second category consists of cases of third-party harassment in
workplaces that are not usually associated with sex or sexual insinuations; and the
third category consists of high-risk areas of employment, where employers take part
in creating a sexual environment. Joseph M. Kelly & Adele Sinclair, Sexual Harass-
ment of Employees by Customers and Other Third Parties: American and British Views,
31 TEX. TECH L. REV. 807, 813–14 (2000). The division adopted in this Article
groups Kelly and Sinclair’s categories one and three under one type of court cases:
where the employer required sexual behavior or dress from the employee. It does so
in order to deal separately with my second type of situations—where no such re-
quirement exists—in order to flesh out the idea of customer domination and cus-
tomer and employer liability.
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sexuality and therefore have voluntarily accepted the consequences of such
work.36
Sage Realty Corp., a landmark case of third-party liability, is an exam-
ple of the first sub-type of cases, where employers require their employees to
dress in a sexualized manner, even when the business is not of a sexual
nature.37 In this case, a lobby receptionist in a Manhattan office building
was required to wear a uniform that revealed both sides of her body, leading
to numerous incidents of third-party harassment. The court determined
that the required uniform was short and sexually provocative, and it found
the employer liable for the sexual harassment the employee experienced
from the public and the building’s tenants.38 Since Sage, courts have dis-
cussed several other situations that fall into this sub-type of cases.39 In severe
situations, liability has been found when employers required their employ-
ees to have sexual relations with customers for the interest of the business,40
or when they communicated an unstated message that doing so was part of
the job.41 In summarizing these cases, Lea Vaughn argues that they establish
two principles: first, that an employer cannot use its mandatory dress code
as a means to legitimatize a policy that requires an employee to dress in a
sexually provocative manner, and second, that in situations where job re-
quirements place employees in positions where they are likely to be
harassed, courts are willing to deem the harassment as foreseeable and as a
violation of Title VII.42 Indeed, finding the employer liable for third-party
harassment is more justified according to the prevailing anti-discrimination
36. See id. at 814–17, 823–31 for an elaborated discussion of various cases within these
categories.
37. See generally E.E.O.C. v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). It is
important to note that this case was decided 5 years before Meritor.
38. Sage Realty, 507 F. Supp. at 607.
39. See, e.g., discussions in E.E.O.C. v. Newtown Inn Assocs., 647 F. Supp. 957 (E.D. Va.
1986) (where cocktail waitresses were required to wear provocative outfits, flirt with
customers and to dance in a sexually provocative manner), and Schonauer v. DCR
Entm’t, Inc., 905 P.2d 392, 395–97 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (a worker hired to be a
waitress—not a dancer—in a topless night club was solicited by the manager to
participate in a “nude waitress contest” and was fired after refusing). A summary of
cases where sexual conduct was required of the worker can be found in Kelly &
Sinclair, supra note 35, at 814–17.
40. See Thoreson v. Penthouse Int’l Ltd., 563 N.Y.S.2d 968 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990)
(noting that an employee was terminated because she refused to have sex with a
Japanese businessman after being pressured to have sexual relations with associates of
her employer, which, in the words of Justice Kassal, were designed to “further the
employer’s financial interests”).
41. See, e.g., Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2002); Lock-
ard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir. 1998); Magnuson v. Peak Tech.
Servs., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Va. 1992).
42. Vaughn, supra note 5, at 33.
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doctrines when the employer’s responsibility for the resulting harm is more
obvious.
A debate over employer responsibility arose with regard to the second
sub-type of cases, in which dress requirements or sexual acts were part of the
job, such as in cases concerning “Breastaurant” (i.e., Hooters) or casino
work. These cases concern businesses that request that their female employ-
ees dress sexually or act in a sexual manner, thus consciously crafting the
image of the business in a way that includes explicit or implicit sexual
messages.43 A series of lawsuits against Hooters, as well as cases regarding
casinos, led to an extensive debate in which three main approaches have
prevailed: the first, stemming from a radical feminist perspective, argues that
sexualized dress and behaviors are demeaning to women, and thus that the
entire concept of Breastaurant and casino activities is an offensive objectifi-
cation of women.44 The second approach adopts a liberal prism, which sees
employees as agents who choose to work in a certain setting and to profit
from their looks.45 The third approach argues that employers have a right to
43. Due to its business model, which focuses on women’s sex appeal and has provocative
dress requirements for waitresses, the successful Hooters restaurant chain has been
the subject of much litigation and public debate. In the early 1990s, a few waitresses
filed sexual harassment suits against Hooters, arguing that the work environment at
Hooters encourages harassment by customers. Those cases were settled, but they
raised the question of liability under Title VII regarding the commodification of
women’s sexuality and women’s freedom of sexual expression. In her article, Jeannie
Sclafani Rhee discusses these suits and suggests a way to deal with harassment with-
out settling this question, namely by imposing liability for third-party acts when the
employer knows of the harassment and fails to take action against the harasser. See
Jeannie Sclafani Rhee, Redressing for Success: The Liability of Hooters Restaurant for
Customer Harassment of Waitresses, 20 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 163 (1997). This is also
highly relevant for casinos, as shown by Ann C. McGinley, Harassing Girls at the
Hard Rock: Masculinities in Sexualized Environments, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1229
(2007) [hereinafter McGinley, Harassing Girls], and other sexualized occupations as
discussed in Ann C. McGinley, Harassment of Sex(y) Workers: Applying Title VII to
Sexualized Industries, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 65 (2006) [hereinafter McGinley,
Sex(y) Workers].
44. Rhee termed this approach the “exploitation theory of liability.” Rhee, supra note 43,
at 166. The “exploitation theory of liability” imposes legal liability on the restaurant
for commodifying female sexuality and is based on the radical feminist theories of
Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon, who objected to the commodification
and objectification of women, which shapes, enables and strengthens women’s sub-
ordination to men, while sustaining their vulnerability. Id. at 180–85.
45. Rhee termed this the “risk acceptance theory of non-liability.” Id. at 167. This view
sees women as autonomous rational actors with freely exercisable market rights; it
argues that the employees were fully aware of their working conditions prior to their
acceptance of the work, so Hooters should not be held liable for harassment. Id. at
190–93; see also Kelly Ann Cahill, Note, Hooters: Should There Be an Assumption of
Risk Defense to Some Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment Claims?, 48 VAND.
L. REV. 1107 (1995) (discussing whether workers who knowingly and voluntarily
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shape their business in a sexualized manner, and that they therefore have a
Bona Fide Occupational Qualifications defense, which permits discrimina-
tion if sex is a legitimate occupational qualification of the job.46 Several
arguments were made regarding the application of the Sage decision to cases
with a sexual work environment.47 Some argue that because Sage does not
distinguish between women who choose to advance their sexuality at work
and those who do not, the decision should not be applied in these cases
where sexual acts or dress codes were part of the business model, because in
these cases it is an issue of choice.48 Another argument was that there should
be more severe requirements for employers in these situations to ensure that
they take extra precautions to protect their employees from sexual
harassment.49
The second type of situations underlying the legal discourse, in which
employer responsibility for third-party harassment is seen by current law as
more difficult to assess, occurs where the employer does not require sexual
behavior or dress from his employees.50 This body of cases has expanded
dramatically in recent years, and the responsibility of the employer is based
on whether he knew or should have known of the harassment.51 In these
particular cases, the courts adopt a weaker form of liability for employers,
which is that of “reasonable accommodation.” This point has been made by
Noah Zatz, who focused more on the divergence of the test adopted in cases
work in sexualized workplaces like Hooters assume the risk resulting from their work
and concluding that, due to two important benefits, the assumption of risk defense
should be introduced into hostile environment sexual harassment law. These benefits
are that employers who market their workers’ sex appeal would be entitled to do so
and that under this defense women would be perceived as free to choose sexually
appealing occupations).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–84); McGinley,
Harassing Girls, supra note 43, at 1270–75.
47. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (stating that courts
should consider context in determining whether actionable sexual harassment
occurred).
48. See Rhee, supra note 43, at 179, stating:
A strict adherence to the rule of Sage Realty would exact a cost from women
who assert and advance their sexuality in public. Regardless of whether her
sexuality is exposed by employer mandate or by the woman’s own agency,
the logic of Sage Realty suggests that public expression of female sexuality
instigates sexual harassment. In either case, female sexuality would best be
left at home; in public it is a danger. At its core, Sage Realty is a decision
against the commodification of female sexuality, with troubling ramifica-
tions for all public expressions of female sexuality.
Id.
49. McGinley, Harassing Girls, supra note 43, at 1275–77.
50. See Kelly & Sinclair supra note 35 at 814–17.
51. EEOC Regulations, supra note 25.
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of third-party harassment from traditional Title VII anti-discrimination the-
ories of disparate treatment or disparate impact, arguing that it “cannot be
squared” with either one of these tests.52
However, in addition to its divergence from those other tests, reasona-
ble accommodation places limited legal responsibility on employers in com-
parison to other situations of sexual harassment at work. This provides a
lower degree of protection to the harassed employees.
Reasonable accommodation requires that reasonable steps be taken to
prevent future harassment and to address complaints. If employers do not
accommodate the situation, the EEOC and courts view them as violating
Title VII. Problematically, courts have been satisfied when employers re-
moved the employee from the customer’s account, or when employers
talked with the customers. This is seen in a number of court decisions. In
the case of Folkerson v. Circus Enterprises Inc.,53 the court found that the
employer (a casino) took reasonable steps to ensure that a worker who had
performed as a living doll on the casino floor would not suffer from cus-
tomer harassment.54 The casino provided her with a sign saying “Stop. Do
Not Touch,” asked a male employee to escort her while she worked, and
requested other employees to notify security if the employee needed
assistance.55
Such an approach has also been adopted in extremely severe situations
of harassment, including rape. The case of Little v. Windermere Relocation,
Inc.56 exemplifies this phenomenon. Maureen Little was employed as a Cor-
porate Services Manager, a position that required her “to develop an ongo-
ing business relationship and relocation contacts with corporations in order
to obtain corporate clients needing relocation services for their employ-
ees.”57 She was terminated from her position, but until her termination, she
had received only positive feedback from her supervisors and had the best
transaction closure record of all corporate managers by a large margin.58
One of Windermere’s clients was Starbucks Corporation, and in 1997, Lit-
tle performed some relocation services for the company, believing that, as
part of her job, she was to build a business relationship with Starbucks
Human Resources Director to secure the account.59 She had at least two
business lunches with the Director toward this end, and one evening she
52. Zatz, supra note 22, at 1357.
53. Folkerson v. Circus Enterprises, Inc., 107 F.3d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1997).
54. Folkerson, 107 F.3d at 756.
55. Folkerson, 107 F.3d at 755.
56. Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 965 (9th Cir. 2002).
57. Little, 301 F.3d at 964.
58. Little, 301 F.3d at 964.
59. Little, 301 F.3d at 964.
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was invited by him to dinner, after which he raped her three times. Little
was reluctant to tell anyone at Windermere about the rape because, in her
own words, “I knew how important the Starbucks account was.”60 After a
few days, however, she reported the incident to the company’s Director of
Relocation Services, who advised her not to tell anyone.61
Nine days passed and Little informed the Vice President of Operations
about the rape. The Vice President “thought it would be best that [Little]
try to put it behind [her] and to keep working in therapy” and that she
discontinue working on the Starbucks account.62 She did not, however, give
Little any advice on going to the police and did not conduct an investiga-
tion into the complaint. The story continues; only after six weeks did Little
report the rape to Windermere’s President, who responded that “he did not
want to hear anything about it,” and that she would have to respond to the
President’s attorneys.63 Shortly afterwards, Little’s pay was reduced, and two
days later, her position was terminated. The court found that Little had
provided sufficient evidence regarding her hostile work environment claim
and the severity of the rape,64 but it also noted that if the employer had
reacted immediately by accommodating the situation, it would not have
been found liable for creating a hostile work environment.65
This line of cases strengthens Zatz’s point that reasonable accommo-
dation is the discrimination doctrine adopted for third-party harassment in
cases where the employer has not treated the worker disparately based on
her sex, but where the sexual harassment resulted from a third party’s con-
duct outside the employer’s control. As noted above, and explored in more
detail in Part III below, the application of the test of “reasonable accommo-
dation” results in a fundamental social problem—it leads to weaker protec-
tion of employees from acts of sexual harassment, while strengthening
women’s subordination in the market. A central part of the problem is the
sole focus on the employer, without recognizing customer domination at
work and its causes (particularly its existence within a triangular relation-
ship). Part III below shows that it is very difficult for employers to address
sexual harassment in these situations, mainly because they do not wish to
60. Little, 301 F.3d at 964.
61. Little, 301 F.3d at 964.
62. Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958. 965 (9th Cir. 2002).
63. Little, 301 F.3d at 965.
64. Little, 301 F.3d at 966–67.
65. Little, 301 F.3d at 966–67. A similar approach was adopted in Dunn v. Wash.
County Hosp., 429 F.3d 689, 691 (7th Cir. 2005), Watson v. Blue Circle, Inc., 324
F.3d 1252, 1258 n.2 (11th Cir. 2003), Turnbull v. Topeka State Hosp., 255 F.3d
1238, 1244 (10th Cir. 2001), and other cases discussed below.
182 M I C H I G A N  J O U R N A L  O F  G E N D E R &  L A W [Vol. 24:167
miss out on potential profits or irritate customers. And, the law does not
require them to do so.
Importantly, in a 2011 decision, the Fourth Circuit held that not all
accommodations can suffice. There, an employer’s offer to transfer a sexu-
ally harassed employee from second shift to first shift, which would have
resulted in the worker being worse off, was insufficient to meet the legal
requirement.66 In this case the suggestion also came too late (months after
the employee first complained about the harassment),67 and when those pre-
vious complaints were not dealt with in a serious manner.68 It is unclear
how the court would have reacted if the employer had taken appropriate
steps directly after he knew of the harassment.
II. GERMANY AND BRITAIN
Other countries have also placed responsibilities on employers for
third-party harassment within the confines of the employer-employee bi-
nary.69 Two will be discussed in this article: Germany and Britain. The
choice to analyze these particular countries stems from the intent to study
how liability is placed on employers in cases of third-party harassment in
other national contexts where such legal liability exists. This is done in order
to assess in more depth academic calls to place greater liability on employ-
ers, following the prevailing paradigm, and to question whether this can
indeed work. The chosen countries vary in the theories that guide their
approaches to sexual harassment (a mixed dignity-equality approach in Ger-
many and an equality approach in Britain, similar to that of the U.S.). They
also differ as to the involvement of the courts in interpreting such liability
(many cases in the U.S., no cases at all in Germany, and a moderate number
of cases in Britain). Lastly, they have different legal frameworks (Title VII
together with the EEOC guidelines and activities in the U.S., the Equal
Treatment Act of 2006 in Germany, and the Equality Act of 2010 in Brit-
ain). What the analysis shows is that despite these differences, and as de-
66. E.E.O.C. v. Cromer Food Servs., Inc., 414 F. App’x 602, 608 (4th Cir. 2011). In
that case, the employee specifically requested to work in the second shift because he
needed to take his child to the hospital during the time of the first shift. Id.
67. Cromer, 414 F. App’x at 608.
68. Cromer, 414 F. App’x at 608.
69. In addition to Germany and Britain, which have established employer responsibility
for third party harassment and will be discussed in this Part, other countries that
have also established such liability include Austria and Belgium. See Ann
Numhauser-Henning & Sylvaine Laulom, Harassment Related to Sex and Sexual Har-
assment Law in 33 European Countries, EUROPEAN COMMISSION 35, 38–39, 46
(2012), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/your_rights/final_harasse
ment_en.pdf, for information on Austria and Belgium.
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tailed below, the problems in addressing harassment of employees by
customers under the binary paradigm are similar.
A. Germany
The political, institutional, and legal situation in Germany differs
from that in the U.S., especially with regard to employment. Although in
the U.S. the legal regulatory route is preferred over State regulation, in Ger-
many, generally, the statutory-corporatist path lends flexibility to workplace
organization and allows employers and unions to regulate the workplace,
preferably through collective agreements.70 The feminist movement, too,
has a different history, with limited activism in the courts. This is very
much evident in the legal situation in Germany, which differs from that of
the U.S. in that in Germany there have been no court decisions on the
sexual harassment of employees by customers, despite the obligations that
the law places on employers and the availability of opportunities to file
complaints against customers.71 Hence, the discussion rests mainly on the
requirements imposed on employers by legislation, and on German com-
mentators who have provided interpretations of these requirements. In Ger-
many’s legal setting, these commentaries are taken very seriously and are
frequently referred to in judgments, even though they are not binding. In
this part of the Article, I will introduce the German legislation and com-
mentaries pertaining to employers’ liability in cases of customer harassment
of employees.
Historically, Section 2, subsection 1 of the Employment Protection
Act of 1994 (Beschäftigungsschutzgesetz), which created a general protection
for employees from sexual harassment, was considered to place responsibili-
ties on employers for the sexual harassment of employees by third parties.
This was stated in the legislative reasoning given by the German Parlia-
ment.72 Under the Employment Protection Act, sexual harassment was seen
as violating one’s dignity. Susanne Baer, a leading German feminist legal
scholar and a justice of the Federal Constitutional Court in Germany, ex-
plained that turning to the idea of dignity in Europe was culturally related
to “a European understanding of harm, and particularly to the understand-
ing of harm developed in Europe after 1945, where human dignity became
70. ZIPPEL, supra note 24, at 4.
71. Earlier this year, a judgment was given on employer responsibilities according to the
AGG in a case of sexual harassment by a supervisor at work. See Decision of the
Labour Court in Weiden (16th of September 2015).
72. Gesetzentwurf [Law Draft], Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksachen [BT] 12/5468,
http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/12/054/1205468.pdf (Ger.).
184 M I C H I G A N  J O U R N A L  O F  G E N D E R &  L A W [Vol. 24:167
the referent for harm of the worst kind.”73 Moreover, dignity links to the
Constitution, or Basic Law of Germany, which places it as the first and
most fundamental individual right.74 The Employment Protection Act in-
deed defined sexual harassment as an intentional sexually-oriented behavior
that violates the employee’s dignity.75 Despite the particular definition of
sexual harassment within the Act, the courts addressed situations of sexual
harassment through the doctrine of mobbing, which deals with long term
attacks at work, including, but not exclusively focusing on, sexual harass-
ment.76 Baer argues that this might have resulted from the shortcomings of
the dignity-based approach, which “renders the European and the German
law against sexual harassment at work inadequate to address the problem.”77
In 2006, with the enactment of the German Equal Treatment Act,
(Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz) (hereinafter, “AGG”), employers’ obli-
gations to prevent sexual harassment by customers were clearly established.78
According to Section 15 of the AGG, an employer is liable for breaches of
organizational duties, including those of Section 12.79 Section 12, subsec-
tion 4 of the AGG notes that “[w]here employees are discriminated against
in the pursuance of their profession by third persons within the meaning of
Section 7(1), the employer shall take suitable, necessary and appropriate
measures, chosen in a given case, to protect the employee in question.”80
Employers also have a duty of care arising out of the employment
relationship.
The AGG took a different declarative direction than the Employment
Protection Act. Following the European Directives,81 the AGG sees sexual
73. Baer, supra note 24, at 588.
74. Id. at 590.
75. Ulrike Lembke, Sexuelle Belästigung: Recht und Rechtsprechung, BUNDESZENTRALE
FUR POLITISCHE BILDUNG (July 2, 2014), http://www.bpb.de/apuz/178676/sex-
uelle-belaestigung-recht-und-rechtsprechung?p=all.
76. ZIPPEL, supra note 24, at 9, 123. Zippel describes mobbing in Germany as
“psychoterror at work” and as “a conflict-laden communication among colleagues or
between superiors and employees, a process by which one or more persons systemati-
cally, over a long period, attack someone directly or indirectly with the goal of
marginalizing and getting rid of him or her.” Id. at 9.
77. Baer, supra note 24, at 590–93.
78. Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz [Equal Treatment Act] [AGG], Aug. 14, 2006,
BUNDESGESTZBLATT, Teil I at 1897 (Ger.) (available in English at http://www.anti
diskriminierungsstelle.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/publikationen/AGG/agg_in_
englischer_Sprache.pdf;jsessionid=9F1872173F37BE44A68D4C34B8967805.2_cid
340?__blob=publicationFile&v=2 (last accessed Feb. 21, 2017)).
79. AGG, Aug. 14, 2006, BGBL. I at 1897, § 15(1–2) (Ger.).
80. AGG, Aug. 14, 2006, BGBL. I at 1897, § 12(4) (Ger.).
81. The AGG represented the implementation of four European Directives: Directive
2000/43/EG; 2000/78/EG; 2002/73/EG (today 2006/54/EG) and 2004/113/EG.
Its definition of sexual harassment is based on Article 2(1)d of Directive 2006/54/
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harassment protections as measures intended to address a problem that af-
fects women in particular,82 thereby introducing into German law the view
of sexual harassment as a form of unlawful discrimination. The AGG’s
objectives are to prevent or stop discrimination on the grounds of race,
ethnic origin, sex, religion or belief, disability, age, and sexual orientation,83
with Sections 3 and 7 of the AGG prohibiting harassment on any of those
grounds. According to Section 3:
Sexual harassment shall be deemed to be discrimination in rela-
tion to § 2(1) Nos. 1 to 4, when an unwanted conduct of a
sexual nature, including unwanted sexual acts and requests to
carry out sexual acts, physical contact of a sexual nature, com-
ments of a sexual nature, as well as the unwanted showing or
public exhibition of pornographic images, takes place with the
purpose or effect of violating the dignity of the person con-
cerned, in particular where it creates an intimidating, hostile,
degrading, humiliating or offensive environment.84
Despite the clear language of the AGG and indications that sexual
harassment of employees by customers is indeed a prevalent phenomenon in
Germany, there has been no case law on the subject (generally, there were
EG, which defines sexual harassment as “where any form of unwanted verbal, non-
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature occurs, with the purpose or effect of
violating the dignity of a person, in particular when creating an intimidating, hostile,
degrading, humiliating or offensive environment.” The definition of sexual harass-
ment in Section 3, subsection 4 of the AGG was following Article 2 of Directive
2006/54/EG, which also referred to an “unwanted action,” while the Employment
Protection Act still asked for intentional behaviour of the perpetrator. See Jobst-
Hubertus Bauer & Steffen Krieger, Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz (Agg) 87
§ 3 Recital 48 (2015).
82. See European Commission Press Release IP/00/588, The Commission Bids to Out-
law Sexual Harassment at the Workplace (June 7, 2000) (on file with author) (“Anna
Diamantopoulou EU Employment and Social Policy Commissioner said: ‘No one
contests that sexual harassment takes place and that it is an unacceptable affront to
the individual concerned, normally—but not always—a woman.’ ”) (emphasis added).
83. AGG, Aug. 14, 2006, BGBL. I at 1897, § 1(1) (Ger.).
84. AGG, Aug. 14, 2006, BGBL. I at 1897, § 3 (Ger.). This English translation of the
Article is the one offered by the German Antidiscrimination Agency, referring to
sexual harassment as a form of discrimination. See generally FED. ANTI-DISCRIMINA-
TION AGENCY, ACT IMPLEMENTING EUROPEAN DIRECTIVES PUTTING INTO EF-
FECT THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL TREATMENT (2009). However, the German
wording of this Article does not use the word “discrimination” but rather the word
“Benachteiligung” (“putting at a disadvantage”). This legal term is not intended to
weaken the protection as compared to the Directives, but can be explained by con-
flicts in connection with the adoption of equal treatment law in Germany. See EURO-
PEAN COMMISSION, supra note 69, at 109.
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very few cases on sexual harassment). This might be because sexual harass-
ment has never been a central issue in German legal policy debates. Writing
in 2006, Kathrin Zippel opens her book The Politics of Sexual Harassment by
presenting an interview she conducted with a German employee who ex-
pressed the belief shared by many in Germany that “Europeans do not have
a problem with ‘sexual harassment’—it’s an American Problem.”85 In Ger-
many, discussions of sexual harassment only began in 1983 with the
“Busengrapscher Affäre,”86 when Klaus Hecker, a member of parliament of
the West German Green party, sexually molested his female employees.87
Later on, several other incidents of sexual harassment were reported and
discussed in the German media,88 and in academic studies, particularly
Baer’s work. As noted above, the Employment Protection Act did not have a
substantial impact in Germany. It was hardly known by employers and em-
ployees, as a survey conducted by the Federal Ministry of Family Affairs,
Senior Citizens, Women and Youth in 2002 has shown.89 The marginality
of sexual harassment discussions in political debates continues to typify Ger-
many today,90 but it does not represent the reality of sexual harassment in
the country. Studies have shown that a high percentage of women in Ger-
many do experience sexual harassment at work,91 in the army,92 and in uni-
versities.93 All of this led the Federal German Anti-Discrimination Agency
to proclaim 2015 to be the year for dealing with sexual discrimination, in-
85. ZIPPEL, supra note 24, at ix.
86. Translated to English as the “Beast Groping Scandal.”
87. ZIPPEL, supra note 24, at 126–27.
88. See id. at 2 (discussing these incidents).
89. ALMUT PFLÜGER, SUSANNE BAER, GABRIELE SCHLICK, MILENA BÜCHS, & UTE
KALENDER, BUNDESMINISTERIUM FÜR FAMILIE, SENIOREN, FRAUEN UND JUGEND,
BESCHÄFTIGTENSCHUTZGESETZ IN DER PRAXIS (2002).
90. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 69, at 108.
91. The latest study conducted by the German Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency on
sexual harassment at work from 2015 found that every second employee experienced
sexual harassment. See FED. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION AGENCY, SEXUAL HARASSMENT
AT WORK—INCIDENCE, CURRENT STATE OF KNOWLEDGE AND MANAGEMENT
STRATEGIES (2015) (“[A]pproximately 50 percent of each group, women and men,
state that they have directly experienced [sexual harassment] once.”).
92. Several studies on sexual harassment in the army have been conducted in Germany
in the years 2005, 2011, and 2014, all showing that a high percentage of women
experience sexual harassment, as do a percentage of men. The most recent study has
shown that 55% of women and 12% of men in the army have experienced some
form of sexual harassment, including sexist jokes, exposure to pornographic material,
unwanted physical contact, sexual assault, and rape. See GERHARD KÜMMEL, TRUP-
PENBILD OHNE DAME?: EINE SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTLICHE BEGLEITUNTERSUCHUNG
ZUM AKTUELLEN STAND DER INTEGRATION VON FRAUEN IN DIE BUNDESWEHR
(2014).
93. See THOMAS FELTES, KATRIN LIST, ROSA SCHNEIDER, & SUSANNE HÖFKER, GEN-
DER-BASED VIOLENCE, STALKING AND FEAR OF CRIME (2012).
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cluding sexual harassment.94 Despite this proclamation, case law on sexual
harassment is still very minimal.
Another reason there has been minimal case law in Germany regarding
sexual harassment is related to the limited sanctions employers face if they
do not comply with sexual harassment laws. Zippel has noted that even
though the U.S. state capacity to address sexual harassment is considered
weak, the EEOC has pursued civil rights litigation and has slowly extended
its institutional capacity to address the issue, with employers risking costs
from complaints and punitive damages for failure to take action.95 This is
not the case in Germany, where there is no German agent that has a respon-
sibility similar to that of the EEOC,96 compensatory damages are insignifi-
cant, the concept of punitive damages does not exist, and many employers
ignore the law.97
Furthermore, the AGG places weak requirements on employers. Ac-
cording to the AGG, the employer must take appropriate measures to put a
stop to discriminatory harassment by employees or third parties. These ap-
propriate measures include disciplinary actions such as suspension of work,
transfer, reduction in salary, demotion or discharge as consequences for em-
ployees in the civil service, and warning, transfer, or dismissal of employees
in private enterprises.98 Appropriate training can be understood as a dis-
claimer of responsibility according to Section 12, subsection 2 of the AGG
(“training defense”).99 Generally, it is sufficient if the employer informs its
staff through notices, letters, etc. about sanctions for discriminatory
behavior.100
Due to the weakness of the law, its application, and its enforcement,
the feminist movement in Germany has generally not used the labor courts
as a vehicle for promoting change in this area.101 The weakness in
94. See FED. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION AGENCY, SURVEY TO MARK THE LAUNCH OF THE
THEMATIC YEAR “GLEICHES RECHT. JEDES GESCHLECHT [EQUAL RIGHTS. EVERY
SEX]”: MAJOR KNOWLEDGE GAPS AMONG WORKFORCE REGARDING SEXUAL HAR-
ASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE (2015).
95. See ZIPPEL, supra note 24, at 38.
96. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 69, at 113 (“The German Anti-Discrimina-
tion Body does not have the power to deal with individual cases, so there is no case
law.”).
97. See ZIPPEL, supra note 24, at 38.
98. See FED. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION AGENCY, GUIDE TO THE GENERAL EQUAL TREAT-
MENT ACT: EXPLANATIONS AND EXAMPLES (2016), at § 4.2.
99. See URSULA RUST & JOSEF FALKE, ALLGEMEINES GLEICHBEHANDLUNGSGESETZ MIT
WEITERFÜHRENDEN VORSCHRIFTEN (AGG) 655–56 (2007).
100. See Monika Schlachter, Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz (AGG), in ERFURTER
KOMMENTAR ZUM ARBEITSRECHT 237, 275–78 (Rudi Müller-Glöge, Ulrich Preis &
Ingrid Schmidt eds., 17th ed. 2017).
101. See ZIPPEL, supra note 24, at 125.
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implementing the AGG might also be attributed to the fact that the AGG
continues to emphasize the infringement of dignity in assessing whether an
act is sexual harassment. The language of dignity has continued to be used
and embedded in the definition of sexual harassment. According to that
definition, the act of harassment has to take place “with the purpose or
effect of violating the dignity of the person concerned.”102 In determining
whether dignity has been violated, weight is given to the seriousness of the
harassment.103 The analysis of the situation is conducted in reference to the
notion of dignity, with a lesser emphasis on equality.104 Although anti-dis-
crimination directives are clear that discriminatory harassment is not limited
to intentional behavior, most German commentaries on the law do not ad-
dress unintentional discrimination, including sexual harassment.105 Indeed,
seeing sexual harassment as a form of discrimination has great potential, but
this has yet to be fully realized and implemented in Germany.106
This background might explain the limited case law on sexual harass-
ment generally. However, there are further reasons for the absence of cases
addressing customer harassment. Similar to the legal approach in the U.S.,
the focus on employer liability leads Germany to adopt less strict require-
ments in cases involving third parties. Once focus is placed on the binary
employment relationship and requirements within the boundaries of that
relationship, opportunities to take more effective measures, which might
involve customer liability, may be questioned. Hence, although the law can
potentially see customers as liable in tort according to Sections 823 and 825
of the BGB (“Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch”—The German Civil Code),107 no
102. AGG, Aug. 14, 2006, BGBL. I at 1897, Art. 1, § 3–4 (Ger.).
103. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 69, at 113–14.
104. A good example is a decision by the German Federal Labour Court in 2014. There,
the court stressed—as it had before—that a violation of another person’s dignity
would be found particularly in cases where the perpetrator establishes a certain envi-
ronment of intimidation, hostility, humiliation or insult. See Fed. Lab. Ct. Judg-
ment, 2 AZR 651/13 at para. 14 (Nov. 20, 2014). The judges decided that the
comment of a male worker addressed to a female colleague that she had nice breasts
was not a compliment but rather an “inappropriate comment of a sexual nature.” Id.
Touching the woman’s breasts following the comment was analyzed as being a “sexu-
ally intended infringement of an intimate sphere of privacy.” Id. The woman’s dig-
nity was seen as infringed upon by these actions, as they could objectively be defined
as “unwanted treatment,” which could further be understood as a degradation of the
woman as being solely seen and treated as a sexual object. Id. Hence, a violation of
her dignity had occurred. As the court had already decided before, a single action can
qualify as a form of sexual harassment—actions need not be repeated. See Fed. Lab.
Ct. Judgment, 2 AZR 323/10 (Jun. 9, 2011).
105. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 69, at 108.
106. On such potential, see id. at 115.
107. According to Civil Code § 823,
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lawsuits have been filed, and customer domination as proposed in this Arti-
cle has not yet been acknowledged.
In Germany, the focus on the employment relationship rests on Sec-
tion 2, subsection 1 of the AGG, which applies sexual harassment prohibi-
tions solely to employment relations.108 Sections 7 and 3 of the AGG
prohibit the employer from discriminating against his employees, and ac-
cording to Section 3, subsection 4, this includes the prohibition on sexual
harassment. The commentaries provide measures in accordance with Sec-
tion 12, subsection 4 that can be taken by employers when their employees
are sexually harassed by third parties (customers included).109 These include
warning letters and the shifting of jobs or responsibilities so the employee
and the harassing customer do not have to work together.110
Other commentaries also mention the option of ceasing a business
relationship with the customer.111 According to the law, the employer has to
take “suitable, necessary and appropriate measures, chosen in a given case to
(1) A person who, intentionally or negligently, unlawfully injures the life,
body, health, freedom, property or another right of another person is liable
to make compensation to the other party for the damage arising from this;
(2) The same duty is held by a person who commits a breach of a statute
that is intended to protect another person. If, according to the contents of
the statute, it may also be breached without fault, then liability to compen-
sation only exists in the case of fault.
BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 823, Aug. 18, 1896, last
amended July 20, 2017, BGBl. I at 2787 (Ger.); see also § 825 (“A person who
induces another person to undertake or acquiesce in sexual acts by cunning, duress
or abuse of a dependency relationship is liable to him for the resulting damage
incurred”).
108. Jens Schubert & Peter Schrader, § 3 Begriffsbestimmungen, in ALLGEMEINES
GLEICHBEHANDLUNGSGESETZ (AGG): HANDKOMMENTAR 225, 258 (Wolfgang
Däubler & Martin Bertzbach eds., 2013).
109. Rudolf Buschmann, § 12 Mabnahmen und Pflichten des Arbeitgebers, in
ALLGEMEINES GLEICHBEHANDLUNGSGESETZ (AGG): HANDKOMMENTAR 497,
499–500 (Wolfgang Däubler & Martin Bertzbach eds., 2013).
110. See, e.g., RUST & FALKE, supra note 99, at 659; § 12 Mabnahmen und Pflichten des
Arbeitgebers, in ALLGEMEINES GLEICHBEHANDLUNGSGESETZ (AGG) BASISKOM-
MENTAR ZU DEN ARBEITSRECHLICHEN REGELUNGEN 216, 224 (Christine Nollert-
Borasio & Martina Perreng eds., 2015).
111. RUST & FALKE, supra note 99, at 651; cf. §12 Mabnahmen und Pflichten des Arbei-
tgebers, in ALLGEMEINES GLEICHBEHANDLUNGSGESETZ (AGG): KOMMENTAR ZUM
AGG UND ZU DEN ANDEREN DISKRIMINIERUNGSVERBOTEN 637–38 (Klaus
Adomeit & Jochen Mohr eds., 2011) (claiming this measure would not be appropri-
ate in most cases); Buschmann, supra note 109 at 590 (noting that barring a cus-
tomer from a bar would in most cases be appropriate, rather than ceasing a business
relationship with the customer, which would jeapordize the entire business
economically).
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protect the employee in question.”112 The wording shows that the employer
has a margin of discretion in choosing the right measure. The decision re-
garding which measures are suitable, necessary, and appropriate has to be
made based on the individual circumstances. The employer’s discretion has
been noted as especially relevant in customer-related cases, and is mentioned
in the explanatory memorandum of the AGG.113
German scholars have debated whether ceasing a business relationship
is an appropriate measure. Following the judgment by the European Court
of Justice in the Feryn racial discrimination case,114 where it was stated that
the business interests of the employer, such as customer wishes and prefer-
ences, cannot serve as a justification for discrimination, it can be argued that
employers are required to take the risk of losing customers. However, cur-
rent German law requires that employers weigh various factors before taking
such steps, including the duration of the business relationship, the severity
of the harassment, and the danger that it will be repeated.115 Also, the com-
mercial relevance of the business relationship may be of great importance
when analyzing the employer’s interests.116 The business interests of the em-
ployer also have to be taken into account, which includes the interests of
other employees in the continued profitability of the workplace. As the right
to choose business partners and the freedom of occupation are constitu-
tional rights, according to Section 12 of the AGG,117 measures that would
affect the economic existence of the employer are not seen as appropriate.118
There are scholars who rely on the following differentiation: in the case of
scattered or selected business relations, it could be necessary to take immedi-
ate measures (e.g., to ban someone from a bar/pub), whereas in the case of
long-lasting business relationships, talking to the customer and informing
the business partner are understood to be appropriate measures,119 and a
sincere effort would be sufficient. Däubler, Bertzbach, and Buschmann
mention that even if ending the business relationship is not appropriate,
effective protection is necessary,120 and Bauer and Krieger noted that in
112. AGG, Aug. 14, 2006, BGBL. I at 1897, § 12(4) (Ger.).
113. Regierungsentwurf, DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN [BT] 16/1780, July
8, 2006, at 37, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/017/1601780.pdf (Ger.).
114. Case C-54/07, Centrum voor Gelijkheid van Kansen en voor Racismebestrijding v.
Firma Feryn NV, 2008 E.C.R. I-5187 at I-5194.
115. RUST & FALKE, supra note 99, at 655–56.
116. NOLLERT-BORASIO & PERRENG, EDS., supra note 110, at 223–24.
117. Gesetz über die Rechtsverhältnisse der Mitglieder der Bundesregierung
[Bundesministergesetz] [BMinG] [Federal Minister Act], §12, July 17, 2015, BGBL
I at 1322 (Ger.).
118. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
119. RUST & FALKE, supra note 99, at 655.
120. Buschmann, supra note 109, at 577.
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“extreme cases,” an employer would have to stop business relations with a
customer in response to the sexual harassment of employees.121 Evidently,
the question of whether ceasing the business is appropriate is highly
debatable.
In Germany, employers’ obligations towards employees in cases of cus-
tomer sexual harassment are limited and can generally be satisfied once the
employer provides information on the prohibition of sexual harassment or
takes accommodation measures. Moreover, collective agreements that are
widespread in Germany,122 including agreements on sexual harassment,123
do not contain, to the best of my knowledge, specific regulations regarding
third-party harassment. Hence, despite the different legal systems in Ger-
many and the U.S., in the end, the legal requirements under German law
that apply to employers in cases of customer harassment of employees are
quite similar to those in the U.S.
B. Britain
The Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 is the historical piece of legisla-
tion providing workers with protections from sexual harassment. Since the
1980s, sexual harassment claims were dealt with by British Courts, which
interpreted employers’ obligations under the Sex Discrimination Act to in-
clude dealing with third-party harassment.124 The 1996 case of Burton v. De
Vere Hotels Ltd. was the first important decision on third-party harass-
ment.125 In Burton, two waitresses of Afro-Caribbean origin, employed by
the hotel, were harassed by an after-dinner speaker in the hotel’s banqueting
room.126 During the show, jokes were made about the sexual organs and
121. Bauer & Krieger, supra note 81, at 215.
122. In Germany, two different types of such agreements exist: collective agreements
(“Tarifvertrag”) between an employer association or between a single employer and
Unions, regulated by the Collective Bargaining Act (“Tarifvertragsgesetz,” or
“TVG”), and company agreements (“Betriebsvereinbarungen”) between the works
council of a certain company and the employer, regulated by the Works Constitution
Act (“Betriebsverfassungsgesetz,” or “BetrVG”). Bernd Waas, Decentralizing Indus-
trial Relations and the Role of Labor Unions and Employee Representatives in Germany,
in Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training, Report No. 3, 2006 13–31, http:/
/www.jil.go.jp/english/reports/documents/jilpt-reports/no3.pdf.
123. See discussion in EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 69, at 110–11, 115.
124. See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EMPLOYMENT, IN-
DUSTRIAL RELATIONS, AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, EMPLOYMENT & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, SEX-
UAL HARRASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (1998); see also
LIZZIE BARMES, BULLYING AND BEHAVIOURAL CONFLICT AT WORK: THE DUALITY
OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 72–77 (2015).
125. Burton and another v. De Vere Hotels Ltd. [1997] ICR 1 (Emp’t App. Trib.) (Eng.)
[hereinafter Burton].
126. Burton, supra note 125, at 3.
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ability of black men.127 After the act was over, one of the guests asked one of
the waitresses “what a black woman’s vagina tasted like,”128 while the other
waitress had problems with another guest who tried to put his arms around
her and made racially and sexually offensive remarks.129 The waitresses went
to court against their employer, claiming racial discrimination under the
Race Relations Act 1976.130 The Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT), re-
versing the industrial tribunal’s decision, accepted the waitresses’ claim and
offered what is known as “the control test.”131 Under the control test, an
employer subjects an employee to the detriment of racial harassment if he
causes or permits the harassment to occur under circumstances in which he
could control whether the harassment happened.132 The control test limits
employers’ liability even more than the U.S. test of “known or should have
known,” because it places liability only when the employer has some control
over the situation.
The control test was subsequently adopted in the sexual harassment
case of a female employee in Go Kidz Go v. Bourdouane.133 There, a chil-
dren’s birthday organizer was harassed by one of the parents. She com-
plained to her employer, who encouraged her to return to the party because
other staff were occupied and “there was not long to go.”134 The acts of
harassment continued and, finally, the worker was dismissed after she de-
clared her intention of reporting the incident to the police.135 The court
decided that the employer did have sufficient control to stop the
harassment.136
Yet, the House of Lords took a step back from the control test in
Pearce v. Mayfield School.137 In that case, the House of Lords decided that
the question of control was insufficient to determine employer responsibil-
ity, and that attention should also be paid to (a) the context of the required
acts of control and (b) the question of whether the employer would have
behaved otherwise if the harassed worker was a man.138 In Pearce, a lesbian
127. Burton, supra note 125, at 3.
128. Burton, supra note 125, at 3.
129. Burton, supra note 125, at 3.
130. Burton, supra note 125, at 4.
131. Burton, supra note 125, at 10.
132. Burton, supra note 125, at 10.
133. Go Kidz Go Ltd. v. Bourdouane [1996] EAT/1110/95 (Emp’t App. Trib.) (Eng.)
[hereinafter Go Kidz Go].
134. Go Kidz Go, supra note 133, at para. 6.
135. Go Kidz Go, supra note 133, at para.10.
136. Go Kidz Go, supra note 133, at para. 24.
137. Pearce v. Governing Body of Mayfield School [2003] UKHL 34, (appeal taken from
EWCA Civ) (UK) [hereinafter Pearce].
138. Pearce, supra note 137, at para. 54, 60–62.
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teacher had been constantly insulted and bullied by students.139 The em-
ployment tribunal found that even though the school took some measures
to stop the acts, it did not do enough. Lord Justice Judge noted that apply-
ing the control test in this case was insufficient, because educational consid-
erations, which the school cited as the reasons for its inaction, were
important as well.140 Moreover, Justice Judge said that the employee had to
prove that the school would have taken other steps to control the situation
in different circumstances, such as if the target of harassment were a male
homosexual employee.141 In the words of the Court:
Liability does not arise simply because it is established that the
school authorities were less understanding and organised, or in-
deed less alert to contemporary attitudes to issues of sexual ori-
entation, but depends rather on whether their approach to the
problem (whether this merited approval or criticism) was less fa-
vourable to the appellant than it would have been to a male
teacher, in the same position, facing the same problems.142
Hence, the Pearce judgment gave greater weight to the view that employer
liability for third-party harassment should also be judged on the basis of a
direct discrimination test, sticking to the exact wording of the legislative
provision in the Sex Discrimination Act 1975,143 instead of on the question
of control.144
The British legislature, however, soon decided differently, with the
amendment of the relevant discrimination laws in Britain to the European-
derived statutory definition of harassment.145 This occurred in April 2008,
when important changes to the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 came into
force, including the placing of specific responsibility on employers in cases
of third-party harassment.146 A similar provision was later established in the
Equality Act of 2010,147 which has replaced the Sex Discrimination Act,
139. Pearce, supra note 137, at para.1.
140. Pearce, supra note 137, at para. 60–63.
141. Pearce, supra note 137, at para. 54.
142. Pearce, supra note 137, at para. 81.
143. BARMES, supra note 124, at 73.
144. James Hand, Employer’s Liability for Third-Party Harassment: An ‘Unworkable’ and
Superfluous Provision, 42 INDUS. L.J. 75, 75 (2013).
145. First, the Race Relations Act of 1976 and the Employment Equality Regulations
(based on both Religion or Belief, as well as Sexual Orientation) were amended in
2003, then the Disability Discrimination Act of 1995 was amended in 2004, and the
Sex Discrimination At of 1975 was amended in 2005.
146. The Sex Discrimination Act 1975, SI 2008/656, reg. 4.
147. Equality Act 2010, c.3, § 26(5).
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expanding employer liability to prevent harassment across seven relevant
protected bases.148 Section 40, subsection 2 of the Equality Act stated that
“[t]he circumstances in which A is to be treated as harassing B under subsec-
tion (1) include those where—(a) a third-party harasses B in the course of
B’s employment, and (b) A failed to take such steps as would have been
reasonably practicable to prevent the third-party from doing so,” limiting
such liability to situations in which the person has been harassed by a third
party on at least two other occasions. However, this Section was soon re-
moved from the Act. The government claimed that it was “unworkable” and
that it placed a regulatory burden on businesses.149 The 2011 “Plan for
Growth” declared that “[t]o make Britain one of the best places in Europe
to start, finance and grow a business,” de-regulation steps needed to be
taken, including “stripping back proposed regulation on dual discrimination
and third-party-harassment from the Equalities Act 2010.”150 The removal
of this section was justified on the basis of the argument that employers
have no direct control over third-party harassment and removing this sec-
tion of the law would save £0.3 million.151
James Hand argued that the abolition of Section 40, subsection 2 in
the Equality Act does not deny that employers bear responsibility for third-
party harassment.152 The broad definition of harassment, as stated in Sec-
tion 26 of the Equality Act, enables the placing of such responsibility re-
gardless, thus establishing employer obligations under Section 40. However,
it is unclear how the courts will interpret the obligation of employers—
whether they will follow the early decision of Burton or the more limited
test of Pearce, considering that more recent judgments have also made fur-
ther amendments to the early test of Burton. For example, in Conteh v.
Parking Partners Ltd,153 the EAT said that an establishment providing car
parking services was not responsible for the racial harassment of its em-
ployee by a third party (where the parking service was provided) because the
employer itself did not create a hostile environment, nor did it treat the
employee differently than it would have treated an employee of a different
148. Age, disability, gender re-assignment, race, religion or belief, sex, and sexual orienta-
tion. Under the Equality Act of 2010, sexual harassment is a form of unlawful dis-
crimination; Section 39 of the Act states, “[a]n employer must not discriminate
against a person,” with Section 40 noting that “[a]n employer (A) must not, in
relation to employment by A, harass a person (B), (a) who is an employee of A’s; (b)
who has applied to A for employment.” Id.
149. HM TREASURY DEP’T FOR BUSINESS INNOVATION & SKILLS, THE PLAN FOR
GROWTH, 2013, at 53 (UK); Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act.
150. Id. at 7.
151. Id. at 53.
152. Hand, supra note 144, at 78–79.
153. Conteh v. Parking Partners Ltd, [2011] ICR 341.
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race or ethnic or national origin. The court said when harassment occurs,
the Race Relations Act of 1976 requires a tribunal to look at the motivation
of the employer and to question whether its conduct—which, according to
the EAT in that decision, also includes inaction—is what led to discrimina-
tion against an employee by a third party.154 In this way, the court presented
two possible situations of employer responsibility: either the employer cre-
ates a hostile environment himself, or there is employer motivation and
causation.
In Sheffield City Council v. Norouzi,155 the court limited the decision
in Pearce, noting that the decision should not necessarily apply to environ-
ments, such as prison and homes, where employees are subjected to “a level
of harassment on a proscribed ground which cannot be easily prevented or
eradicated.”156 In Sheffield City Council, a child in a care home assaulted a
social worker employed in the home on the basis of his Iranian origin, lead-
ing the worker to eventually take sick leave and not return.157 “In such
cases,” said the EAT, “the employer should indeed not too readily be held
liable for conduct by third parties which is in truth a hazard of the job.”158
However, it found no ground in the particular case to reverse the employ-
ment tribunal’s decision that the employer had not done enough to protect
the employee from harassment and discrimination by one of the children.159
As a result, the employer was held liable for racial harassment and racial
discrimination.
To conclude, even though both British and U.S. law see sexual harass-
ment as an issue of discrimination, and see employers as liable in cases of
third-party harassment, such liability in Britain is even more limited than in
the U.S. Moreover, in Britain, the intention not to place a burden on busi-
nesses was central in deciding to de-regulate legal obligations when these
were previously more heavily applied through legislation.
III. UNDERSTANDING THE PREVAILING PARADIGM
A. Strengths and Shortcomings
That employers are faced with liability in cases of third-party harass-
ment has been an important step towards dealing with the phenomenon of
sexual harassment of employees by customers. This is particularly true when
154. Conteh v. Parking Partners Ltd, supra note 153, at para. 28–30.
155. Sheffield City Council v. Norouzi, [2011] IRLR 897.
156. Sheffield City Council v. Norouzi, supra note 155, at para. 25.
157. Sheffield City Council v. Norouzi, supra note 155, at para. 3.
158. Sheffield City Council v. Norouzi, supra note 155, at para. 25.
159. Sheffield City Council v. Norouzi, supra note 155, at para. 25–26.
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considering that third-party harassment has not yet been recognized in some
countries.160 Also, the development of tests and the provision of guidance by
U.S. courts and the EEOC to address this situation, such as the various
informational guidelines offered to the public to raise awareness of the phe-
nomenon and of the attendant legal liability, have been crucial to further
the protection of employees from this type of harassment.161 However, this
paradigm has limitations. Emerging from the discussion above, including
the comparison of the U.S. to Germany and Britain, is the limited liability
of employers and the weaker protection given to employees suffering from
customer harassment in comparison to other situations of workplace sexual
harassment. This results from a number of causes to which the discussion
has pointed.
First, employers are conceived, within the legal regimes, as generally
having less control over third parties, including customers, than they do
over employees, and this has been used to differentiate cases of third-party
harassment from those of co-worker harassment.162 Such reasoning explains
the legal approaches in the U.S. and Germany where employers fulfill their
legal obligations in cases of customer harassment by adopting a company-
wide protocol, training employees, or providing reasonable accommodations
to the victim of sexual harassment. I agree with Zatz that the U.S. courts’
inclusion of reasonable accommodation within Title VII is important.163
Yet, I argue that the test of “reasonable accommodation,” and particularly
its application by the courts, is insufficient to deal adequately with the sex-
ual harassment of employees by customers.
Second, it seems that in all three legal regimes, employers are not ex-
pected to revoke their business relations with the customer as a response to
the sexual harassment of one of their employees, or even to necessarily raise
their concerns before valued customers. In Britain, it was the desire to avoid
placing burdens on businesses that led to the abolition of Section 40, sub-
section 2, which specifically placed liability on employers for third-party
harassment.164 Third, in single or infrequent incidents of harassment by cus-
tomers, employers are generally not found liable. In the U.S., this is due to
the test of reasonableness and the severity of the harassment.165 In Britain,
160. This is the current situation in Croatia, Israel, and Italy, for example. See EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, supra note 69, at 56–61, 154; see generally Prevention of Sexual Har-
assment Law, 5758–1998, as amended (Isr.).
161. See Part I supra.
162. Sarah L. Ream, When Service with a Smile Invites More Than Satisfied Customers:
Third-Party Sexual Harassment and the Implications of Charges Against Safeway, 11
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 107, 115 (2000).
163. Zatz, supra note 22, at 1361.
164. Equality Act 2010, supra note 147, at c.3, § 40(2).
165. See Ream, supra note 162, at 111 (discussing the test of reasonableness).
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the abolished Section 40, subsection 2 required that the harassment had
occurred by the same party on at least two other occasions. Seeing the weak
protection the law provides to employees suffering from harassment, I ques-
tion its concentration on the employer-employee binary and the leaving of
customers aside.
B. Why Focus on the Employer-Employee Binary?
The most obvious explanation for the legal concentration on an em-
ployer-employee binary relationship and consequently on the employer’s
limited liability is that, in most Western countries, the U.S. included, the
structure of employment relations is built upon the Fordist employment
model of the industrial era.166 That model has two cornerstones: it looks
solely to the employer-employee production process found in large factories
of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, which the notion
of “Fordism” represents; and, it is based on a conception of the male bread-
winner, engaged in full-time, long-term, personal, and bilateral employ-
ment. As I have written elsewhere, “it is a work model that ignores
consumption,” and also ignores customers.167 This is true of Title VII,
which places responsibility on employers, and not on customers, to act in
non-discriminatory ways. Additionally, according to Section 2000e-2, only
an employer can commit unlawful employment practices.168 The German
AGG applies to employers, similarly to Section 39 and Section 40 of the
Equality Act, which establish British employers’ liability for discrimination
and harassment. These obligations, which apply to the employer alone,
leave customers aside.
Employment studies have strongly criticized the bounding of the dis-
cussion to the employer-employee binary, focusing on the need to go be-
yond it and apply legal responsibility to third parties. But these discussions
focused primarily on situations of agency and subcontractor employment.169
Court decisions have also placed liability on third parties beyond the
employer in cases of agency and subcontractor employment.170 However,
the courts have not gone beyond those parties to look into customers.171
166. See KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULA-
TION FOR THE NEW WORKPLACE 48–49 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2004).
167. Albin, supra note 20, at 967.
168. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–45).
169. M.R. FREEDLAND, THE PERSONAL EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT 40 (Oxford Univ.
Press 2003); Brishen Rogers, Toward Third-Party Liability for Wage Theft, 31 BERKE-
LEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2010).
170. See infra Part V (discussing the development of the joint employment doctrine).
171. My view is that agencies and subcontractors should be seen as customers as well, and
that placing responsibilities on them is an important first step toward recognizing the
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The main reason for this is that employers are seen as the actor in the
best position to eliminate harassment in the workplace.172 Employers have
the economic means to cover damages caused by sexual harassment; they
have responsibilities towards their employees that are more comprehensive
than protection from sexual harassment alone. Also, it is much easier to
enforce obligations on employers than on third parties. Lastly, the employer
has the ability to externalize the costs of such liabilities on to the customers
themselves. Although these are sound reasons for employer liability, they do
not deny, I believe, recognizing customers’ domination and their integration
in employment.
This exposes another explanation for the lack of focus on customer
domination, which is the law’s assumption that the customer is a vulnerable
subject. During the second half of the previous century, the consumer pro-
tection movement began to develop, leading to the adoption of consumer
protection laws. These laws sought to correct injustices that customers had
suffered, viewing the consumer as the weaker party in the customer-seller
relationship.173 Consumer protection justifies regulation to remedy market
distortions and to correct misimpressions that products or services possess
or yield greater value than they actually do. Hence, such regulation—per-
ceived to be a public interest—aims to protect consumers from externalities,
inadequate competition, price gouging, asymmetric information, unequal
bargaining power, and various other market failures.174 This led U.S. agen-
cies to adopt various tools to address the problem, with some arguing that
these tools are not sufficient.175
Theoretical discussions and the law, however, view customers as pow-
erful entities in limited situations. One of these areas is labor and employ-
ment. For example, the labor literature has called on customers to boycott
companies whose products were made in violation of employees’ rights in
third party of customers beyond agency and subcontractor situations. Albin, supra
note 20.
172. Susan M. Mathews, Title VII and Sexual Harassment: Beyond Damages Control, 3
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 299, 312 (1991).
173. LAUREN KROHN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW: A DICTIONARY 8–13
(1995); Robert Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of
Advertising, 90 HARV. L. REV. 661, 663–69 (1977).
174. Id.; DAVID L. KASERMAN, GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS: THE ECONOMICS OF AN-
TITRUST AND REGULATION 9–15 (1994).
175. See David Adam Friedman, Reinventing Consumer Protection, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 45
(2007); Christopher Koopman et al., The Sharing Economy and Consumer Protection
Regulation: The Case for Policy Change, 8 J. BUS. ENT. & L. 529, 530 (2015); Jane K.
Winn, Is Consumer Protection an Anachronism in the Information Economy?, in CON-
SUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE ‘INFORMATION ECONOMY’ 1 (Jane K.
Winn ed., 2006).
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the Global South.176 Additionally, in cases of end-users (customers of sub-
contractor and employment agencies), courts see these end-user customers
as liable for the employment rights of the subcontractor and employment
agency employees.177 These situations, however, are marginal in comparison
to the consumer protection paradigm. For the sake of clarity, I should em-
phasize that it is not that customers cannot be found liable under current
laws. Rather, it is that this path is not typically taken, nor has it been the
focus of academic studies. More importantly, there has been insufficient
recognition of dominating customers and the impact they can have over
employees. This is highly evident in the Dunn v Wash. County Hospital
court decision, which compares the harassing third party to a Macaw, miss-
ing the potential social and economic power of these third parties.178
C. Emerging Legal Problems
In addition to the weaker protection given to employees under the
current legal paradigm that focuses on the employer-employee binary, there
are two fundamental legal problems with that paradigm. The first problem
is that under the current paradigm, placing responsibility for third-party
harassment on employers, without assessing the integration of customers
within the work relationship, diverges from the two legal doctrines applica-
ble in sexual harassment cases—those of disparate treatment and disparate
impact. As mentioned above, in cases of third-party harassment, including
customer harassment, legal responsibility is placed on employers if they
knew or should have known about the harassment and failed to take reason-
able corrective or preventive action.179 The courts do not necessarily require
a finding that discrimination occurred within the decision-making process
of the employer himself; rather, the discrimination can be due to actions
taken by the customer.180 This is, as Zatz argued, a distortion of the dispa-
rate treatment doctrine that addresses treatment of a person in a manner,
which, but for that person’s sex [or other protected class membership],
would be different. In third-party cases, courts do not demand that the
employer’s disparate treatment be established at all; instead, they analyze
176. See Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 503
(2007).
177. This has happened more often when both were in the same country, see discussion
infra Part V. However, it has also been discussed in regard to the global setting, see
Rogers, supra note 169.
178. Dunn v. Washington Cty. Hosp., 429 F.3d 689, 691 (7th Cir. 2005).
179. See supra Part I.
180. Zatz, supra note 22, at 1377. However, as discussed above, such requirements have
begun to appear in more recent British court decisions. See supra pp. 22–26.
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whether the third-party harasser acted with discriminatory intent.181Thus,
the customer’s behavior is the basis for determining the sexual harassment
liability of employers.
The liability of employers for third-party harassment is not the first
instance of divergence from the disparate treatment doctrine in relation to
harassment. The hostile environment claim and the responsibility of em-
ployers for co-worker harassment have been seen as diverging from this the-
ory as well.182 The legal tests applied in these situations differed from those
of cases that have been termed in early feminist literature as quid pro quo.
However, in comparison to hostile environment or co-worker harassment,
under the current paradigm, in third-party harassment employers do not
seem to have a link to the harassing customers, because the latter are consid-
ered as external to the organization. Zatz has called this “external causa-
tion,” meaning “a causal connection between an employee’s protected class
membership and workplace injury, one in which class membership enters
the causal chain outside the employer’s decisionmaking process.”183
Yet, as I will discuss below, I believe that once customer domination at
work is exposed within the employer-employee-customer triangular, Zatz’s
theory is open to criticism and the current law becomes clearer. This is
because the triangular relationship shows that the causation is internal,
meaning that customers are linked to the employer and are integral to the
organization. Recognized as such, placing liability on employers in cases of
customer harassment is similar to employer liability in situations of co-
worker harassment. This makes the Dunn case, and particularly its state-
ment that it makes no difference whether the harassment occurs by a
human or a non-human184—on which Zatz rests many of his arguments—
181. Zatz, supra note 22, at 1378–79.
182. Aalberts & Seidman, supra note 7, at 453–57; Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sex-
ual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1714–16 (1998); Zatz, supra note 22, at 1411.
Highly relevant for this discussion is what Zatz writes in note 211, where he says the
following:
Whether to characterize harassing supervisory conduct as part of the em-
ployer’s decisionmaking process is sometimes ambiguous for the reasons so
thoughtfully discussed in Justice Souter’s Faragher opinion. Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 793–804 (1998). As the doctrine has devel-
oped subsequently, however, many lower courts have made the Faragher/
Ellerth defense available even when supervisory harassment takes the form
of adverse conduct clearly within the scope of supervisors’ duties, such as
decisions about suspensions, task assignment, and transfers. See, e.g., Roe-
buck v. Washington, 408 F.3d 790, 793–94 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Zatz, supra note 22, at n. 211.
183. Zatz, supra note 22, at 1389.
184. Dunn v. Washington Cty. Hospital, 429 F.3d 689, 691 (7th Cir. 2005).
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problematic. If one recognizes customer domination, then the question of
whether harassment occurs by a human or a non-human makes a significant
difference for determining if this is internal or external causation. Also, in
recognizing the employer-employee-customer triangular, the internalization
of customers becomes more evident. Once internal, the analysis regarding
the employer’s legal liability changes, as does the analysis regarding cus-
tomer responsibility. In other words, seeing the causation as internal might
justify requiring the employer to take more significant steps than he is cur-
rently expected to under the reasonable accommodation test to address cus-
tomer harassment. It also justifies placing specific and rigid liability on the
customer himself.
The second fundamental problem with the prevailing paradigm is that
the focus on the employer-employee binary obstructs a clear understanding
of the domination of third parties in work relationships in today’s societies,
especially when the third party is a customer or client. In other words, the
focus on the employer obstructs our understanding of customer domination.
Although the facts in the case law describe customer domination, these facts
serve as background to assessing employer causality and thus liability. In this
way, the dominating customer is being marginalized within the legal dis-
course. For example, in Llewellyn v. Celanese Corp, a woman truck driver
was harassed by her co-workers, as well as by a male supervisor in the cus-
tomer’s plant who touched the truck driver’s breasts.185 When the truck
driver reported this to her own supervisor, his answer was that the “cus-
tomer is always right.”186 The court focused on the acts of the truck driver’s
co-workers and supervisors with minimal attention to the harassment inci-
dent itself and the behavior of the customer. It also did not address the way
in which the statement that “the customer is always right” builds customer
domination. Further, in EEOC Decision No. 84-3,187 four male customers
in a restaurant sexually harassed a waitress, making vulgar comments and
trying to touch her. The waitress reported the incident to the restaurant
owner. The entire discussion by the EEOC centered on whether the em-
ployer knew or should have known about the conduct and whether he took
immediate and appropriate corrective action. The EEOC also considered
the extent of the employer’s control and any other legal responsibility that
the employer might have towards the harassing customers.188 However, the
customers’ conduct served only as a background to assess the employer’s
behavior. Additionally, in the case of Little discussed above, the focus of the
court was on the employer’s lack of action, without seriously addressing the
185. Llewellyn v. Celanese Corp., 693 F. Supp. 369, 371–72 (W.D.N.C. 1988).
186. Llewellyn, 693 F. Supp. at 372.
187. EEOC Decision No. 84-3, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1887 (1984).
188. Id. at 4–6.
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customer’s actions. In all these cases, the domination of customers is highly
evident but only marginally discussed, and the role of employers in shaping
the power of customers through various practices is ignored as well. It is
time, I believe, to place both at the center of our attention.
IV. CUSTOMER DOMINATION AT WORK
It is of extreme interest that literature in the field of sexual harassment
by third parties adopted, almost without any hesitation, the prevailing para-
digm of the employer-employee binary. Even though some recognition has
been made of the role of employers in shaping customers’ power, this was
not based on a full appreciation of how customer domination is built.
Vaughn wrote in 2002 that more should be demanded from employers be-
cause they “are not the helpless entities that courts seem to make them out
to be.”189 Additionally, McGinley, who has acknowledged some aspects of
what I include in the notion of customer domination (i.e., masculinity),
argued that more severe liability should apply to employers in sexualized
industries.190 This has been the approach of others as well.191 Although I
agree that employers should bear stricter liability in some cases of customer
harassment, I argue that this is not bound only to sexualized industries, and
that such liability should be applied alongside the placing of liability on
customers under an alternative paradigm that I propose. This alternative
paradigm is what I term customer domination at work.
The notion of customer domination at work acknowledges that custom-
ers have become key players within the work domain and have integrated
into the employment relationship. Moreover, it stresses that their domina-
tion does work, i.e. it is effective and not theoretical, with numerous em-
ployees reporting sexual harassment by customers. At times, customer
domination is shaped by employers, but it is maintained by both parties
while customers exploit their power in harassing employees. The discussion
points to three aspects of customer domination: masculinity, authority, and
service-market power.
189. Vaughn, supra note 5, at 85.
190. McGinley, Sex(y) Workers, supra note 43, at 90–92.
191. See Schoenbaum, supra note 20, at 1237–40; Jamie C. Chanin, What Is It Good For?
Absolutely Nothing: Eliminating Disparate Treatment of Third Party Sexual Harassment
and All Other Forms of Third Party Harassment, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 385, 417–20
(2006) (supporting the view that employers should be liable for third-party harass-
ment, arguing that it should extend beyond sexual harassment to other forms of
harassment).
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A. Masculinity
The legal development that eventually led to the placement of liability
on employers regarding sexual harassment in the workplace was based on a
view of sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination. Such a position
resulted from years of feminist activism that, at some point, began focusing
quite intensively on sexualized actions against women.192 Around the mid-
1970s and the 1980s, feminists were unified in holding men accountable for
intimate violations that, until that point, had been seen as part of private
sphere activity. They argued, instead, that sexual harassment was a public
issue and a discriminatory action against women.193 In her work Sexual Har-
assment of Working Women, Catharine MacKinnon grounded this perception
of sexual harassment within legal thought, arguing that harassment is prob-
lematic because sexual relations are the primary mechanism of preserving
male domination and women’s subordination at work.194 MacKinnon estab-
lished how the intimate violation of women by men is “contained by inter-
nalized and structural forms of power,”195 stressing the interconnection
among sexual harassment, workplace discrimination, and the economic
rights of women, and also showing how this interrelationship often results
in degrading working conditions for women.196 She showed how the use of
power that is gained in one social sphere is applied to another, creating a
dynamic that enables the harasser to receive benefits.197 The major dynamic
she refers to derives from two inequalities: male sexual domination and the
employment relationship.198 In this way, the demand for sexual favors can
be a condition for hiring, promotion, other economic advantages, and keep-
ing one’s job. On the basis of MacKinnon’s study, courts have recognized
192. Schultz discusses the history of the sexuality paradigm regarding harassment,
stressing that the focus on sexuality was preceded by a debate within radical feminist
thought on sexuality (some claiming it was “redeemable” while “others argued it was
intrinsically dominated by men”) and on men’s motivations (some claimed men
“defend[ed] their power in order to obtain services [including sex] from women,”
while others argued that the services required were intended “to affirm their sense of
power”). Schultz, supra note 182, at 1698 (quoting Ellen Willis, Radical Feminism
and Feminist Radicalism, in NO MORE NICE GIRLS: COUNTERCULTURAL ESSAYS
117, 133 (1992)).
193. See JEFFREY WEEKS, SEXUALITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS 255–56 (1985); Schultz,
supra note 182, at 1700–01.
194. See generally CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN (Yale Univ. Press 1979), Introduction.
195. Id. at 1.
196. Id. at 40–47.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 2.
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sexual harassment as a form of discrimination in both quid pro quo and
hostile environment situations.199
The theory of why there is sexual harassment has developed over years
of study, turning away from MacKinnon’s earlier work, which conceptual-
ized the wrong of sexual harassment as the institutionalization of women’s
subordination, to other theories.200 However, the argument that there is also
a sex-based dynamic within the workplace continues to be dominant within
research.201 This dynamic is highly prominent in service occupations, where
women are required to be sexually pleasing for male customers, a situation
that McGinley has called “sexualized environments.”202 In her study, Mc-
Ginley argued that these environments work to sustain the masculinity of
customers. “Masculinity comprises both a structure that reinforces the supe-
riority of men over women and a series of practices, associated with mascu-
line behavior, performed by men or women that maintain men’s superior
position over women at work.”203 Employees’ bodies and behaviors serve to
further this goal. Studies have also shown that waitresses see sex as part of
199. MacKinnon defines quid pro quo as conduct where sexual compliance is exchanged
or proposed to be exchanged for an employment opportunity, and a hostile environ-
ment as a situation in which sexual harassment “simply makes the work environment
unbearable.” Id. at 32, 40. In her earlier work MacKinnon did not use the term
hostile environment, but rather the term “condition of work” harassment. The
EEOC adopted in its 1980 definition of sexual harassment both these concepts as a
violation of Title VII. Section 1604.11(a) of the Code of Federal Regulations codi-
fied it later as well. See supra discussion, at 7.
200. Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
1169 , 1169–70 (1997). Abrams discusses in that article the works of Anita Bern-
stein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 446 (1997); and
Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment, 49 STAN. L. REV.
691–772 (1997). Bernstein argued in her work that the reasonableness standard used
for assessing sexual harassment in the workplace should be replaced with the term
respect, which leads to seeing all human beings as having “respect warranting traits.”
These traits impose three duties on others, to refrain from: (1) treating another per-
son only as means of achieving one’s ends; (2) humiliating another person; and (3)
denying the personhood and self-conception of another person. Bernstein, supra, at
482–92. Franke argues that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination be-
cause it embodies fundamental gendered stereotypes of men and women, inscribing,
enforcing and policing the identities of both harasser and victim according to a sys-
tem of gendered norms. In this way it is an act of subordination. According to
Franke, the arguments at that time on sexual harassment failed because they ex-
plained why sexual harassment differentiates women without explaining why sexual
harassment discriminates against women. She therefore argues for a theory that fo-
cuses on the creation of gendered bodies—feminine women and masculine men—
turning women into objects. Franke, supra, at 693, 762.
201. Abrams, supra note 200, at 1205.
202. McGinley Harassing Girls, supra note 43, at 1229–30.
203. Id. at 1230 (footnote omitted).
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their jobs, or as linked to “the territory of being a waitress[,]”204 as do room
attendants and others. Sexualized work environments harm, therefore, not
only the individual woman but also women generally, for these environ-
ments reflect and perpetuate gendered norms.205 Customer masculinity is
shaped in these sexualized work environments backed by employers, who
organize their businesses in this way, justifying employer liability. But,
alongside such backing, it is customers themselves who use their masculinity
to harass the employees, maintaining the superiority of men over women.
It is not only within sexualized environments that customer masculin-
ity is present and enforced through sexual harassment of employees. Mascu-
linity is found in many other occupations as well, including in white-collar
occupations, as we have learned from the studies of customers harassing
lawyers and accountants.206 Male customers believe that women employees
should smile and dress in a feminine manner, creating what has been
termed in the literature as “institutionalized sexism,” which is based on pre-
sumed gender roles and therefore re-inscribes masculinity and femininity.
Institutionalized sexism, present in sexualized work environments, contrib-
utes to gender inequality in the workplace, and in society more generally.207
Customer harassment of employees is broader than sexual behavior
alone, and includes, as McGinley argued, practices that enforce masculine
behavior.208 Customer behavior in encounters with female employees works
to maintain the customers’ superiority within the business, service, or soci-
ety at large. This is particularly true given the two aspects of their superior-
ity that will be discussed further below: authority and service market power.
As Vicki Schultz argued, the most prevalent forms of harassment at work are
activities “that are designed to maintain work—particularly the more highly
rewarded lines of work—as bastions of masculine competence and author-
ity,” which go beyond male-female sexuality.209 This is what she calls the
competence-centered paradigm, which understands harassment “as a means
to reclaim favored lines of work and work competence as masculine-identi-
fied turf—in the face of a threat posed by the presence of women (or lesser
204. Lisa Huebner, It Is Part of the Job: Waitresses and Nurses Define Sexual Harassment, 24
SOC. VIEWPOINTS 75, 80 (2008). Similarly, Matulewicz’s article begins with the
following quote from an interview she held with “Amanda,” a server and bartender
in one of the restaurants: “When you go into this industry you generally know that it
is definitely going to be part of your job description, that you’re gonna get hit on.”
Matulewicz, supra note 12, at 402.
205. This allies with Franke’s theory. See Franke, supra note 200.
206. See supra notes 10 and 14.
207. ZIPPEL, supra note 24, at 15.
208. McGinley Harassing Girls, supra note 43, at 1230.
209. Schultz, supra note 182, at 1686–87.
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men) who seek to claim these prerogatives as their own.”210 Instead of sexu-
ality, this paradigm focuses on the link between a hostile work environment
and job segregation by sex. It has been shown that the segregation of women
at work is not only maintained by employers and co-workers but also by
male customers.211 Employers, co-workers, and customers jointly create a
hostile work environment, maintaining job segregation by sex simultane-
ously undermining women’s competence at work.
B. Authority
Authoritative theories have also been proposed to explain the liability
placed on employers regarding sex in the workplace. These theories posit the
abuse of authority as a more sound explanation for employer liability than
masculinity alone. Galia Schneebaum explains that criminal sex offenses in
authoritative relations “share a common element: they all proscribe sexual
contact within a certain type of social relationship in which one side holds a
position of power over the other. . . .”212 According to Schneebaum, it is not
liberal conceptions of sexual autonomy213 or feminist domination theories214
that explain the decision to see such a behavior as an offense; rather, it is the
recognition that the abuse of authority is at the core of this behavior. The
abuse of authority is achieved when bureaucratic power extends into per-
sonal relationships.215 Title VII can also be read as recognizing the abuse of
authority by employers. Employer liability for sexual harassment in hostile
environment situations, as well as co-worker harassment and third-party
harassment, reflects a focus on the authority employers have over their em-
210. Id. at 1755.
211. This is particularly true in regard to occupations that build on women’s sexuality,
but also in other workplaces where the effects of sexual harassment by customers are
similar to those of employer and co-worker harassment. See Vaughn, supra note 5, at
5–20.
212. Galia Schneebaum, What is Wrong with Sex in Authority Relations? A Study in Law
and Social Theory, 105 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 345, 347 (2016).
213. According to the liberal conception, sexual autonomy is the underlying value, and
thus consent is needed in sexual relations. Non-consent thus becomes the focus of
legal sexual doctrines. The liberal development enabled the detachment of sexual
offenses from the application of physical force and coercion. According to this the-
ory, because the balance of power in authority relations may be the reason that
subordinates agree to unwanted sexual acts made by a superior, autonomy is in-
fringed upon. See id.
214. Gender theories see the existence of masculinity as raising doubts as to whether there
was true consent to sex, even when physical force or threats were not used. The
relationship is explained by terms such as “power dependency relations” or “disparate
power relations,” leading to a focus on one party’s power over another, with the
relationship having, as Schneebaum notes, “a hierarchical nature.” Id. at 364–65.
215. Id. at 349.
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ployees. While the law has indeed recognized a few situations of authorita-
tive domination, as in medical treatment and therapy and in education,216 it
has yet to do so in the context of relations with customers. In this section, I
argue that customers deploy such authority and that their authoritative
power is similar to the authoritative power of employers.
Authority, as the literature on the subject teaches us, is a social power
that can be used to direct, instruct, and guide others on the basis of per-
ceived legitimacy.217 Authoritative power not only operates within social re-
lations but also is created by society and gains its validity and acceptance
through social norms.218 Hence, it relies on “a hierarchical order of com-
mand and obedience and on a common belief in the legitimacy of that
order. . . .”219 Hugh Collins wrote that the legitimate authority of employers
over employees is not only built through an employment contract but is also
established by organizational norms that create a workplace hierarchy.220 An
employee joins a bureaucratic organization and is then allocated to a partic-
ular role, which is defined by the rules of the institution. “These bureau-
cratic rules create a hierarchy of ranks rising from the manual worker on the
shop floor to the highest echelons of management. Having been assigned his
role, the employee then finds himself in a relation of subordination with
those above him in the system of ranks. . . .”221 Mark Freedland and Paul
Davies have described these authoritative relations within employment,
where the elementary phenomenon of social power includes “command and
obedience, rule making, decision making, and subordination. . . .”222
As noted above, most employment law literature has focused on the
social norms that provide an employer with authority. Yet, social science
studies teach us that current social norms of services and consumerism have
led to the integration of customers within the business, providing them with
authority over the employees of that business.223 The authoritative power of
customers is embedded in the legitimacy of the hierarchical order that places
them in a position of power, with customers’ authoritative power also
grounded in the characteristics and culture of our current consumer-led ser-
vice economy.
216. Id. at 350–51, 353–54.
217. See ANTHONY KRONMAN, MAX WEBER 38–39 (William Twining, ed. 1983).
218. Schneebaum, supra note 212, at 368.
219. Id. at 369.
220. Hugh Collins, Market Power, Bureaucratic Power and the Contract of Employment, 15
INDUS. L. J. 1, 1–2 (1986).
221. Id. at 1.
222. PAUL DAVIES & MARK FREEDLAND, KAHN-FREUND’S LABOR AND THE LAW 14
(1983).
223. Fuller and Smith, supra note 3, at 10–11.
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Indeed, in the past few centuries, services have become central in the
economies of most Western countries.224 According to Bryson, Daniels, and
Warf, in services there is “a direct, even dialectical, relationship between
service production and consumption[,]”225 and these activities continually
take place simultaneously.226 Hence, any attempt to isolate production and
consumption in today’s world is pointless, or in their words, “it is too much
of an over-simplification of the economic.”227 They coined the term “Ser-
vice Worlds” in “an attempt to highlight the importance of service activities
as an integral part of the production process, tangible or intangible. . . .”228
In these economies, customers become integrated within the organization,
creating what has been termed in the literature as “a worker-employer-cus-
tomer triangle,” consisting of employers, employees and customers.229 The
mixed interests of the three parties shape power relations in a variety of
work relationships, providing power to customers.230 The authoritative
power of customers is based on the perception that the customer is always
right and that service should be given with a smile. This power extends
further, however, when customers perform employment functions, such as
determining the salary of employees (through the provision of tips or other
types of benefits), affecting hiring and firing decisions when deciding to
compliment or complain about an employee, and affecting the organization
of work by creating specific requirements, like the quality of work expected
from lawyers, accountants and others, or the specific service the customer
expects to receive. These actions conform to the definition of authoritative
power described above.
Many cases have shown that customer’s authoritative power has af-
fected women’s careers. Consider, as an example, the case of Reynolds v.
Atlantic City Convention Center.231 The case included allegations of various
actions constituting a hostile environment, including the removal of female
electricians from the floor of the convention center during the Miss America
Pageant—due to customers’ complaints—and replacing them with men.232
The day after the pageant, the female employees were fired.233 Another ex-
ample of customer control of a work environment is found in Magnuson v.
224. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 1 and accompanying text.
225. BRYSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 4.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 3.
229. LEIDNER, supra note 2, at 174; Albin, supra note 2, at 3.
230. LEIDNER, supra note 2, at 127–28.
231. Reynolds v. Atl. City Convention Ctr., Civ. A. No. 88-4232, 1990 WL 267417
(D.N.J. May 26, 1990), aff’d 925 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1991).
232. Id. at *5.
233. Id.
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Peak Technical Services, Inc.,234 where a customer responded to an em-
ployee’s refusal of his sexual advances by threatening her career, saying that
he “could make or break [her] career” based on his reports to her em-
ployer.235 As this Article has shown, employers have repeatedly asked
women to tolerate harassment as part of the business, or because com-
plaining could lead to the loss of an important customer.236 This reflects the
integration of customers into the hierarchy of organizations, which gives
customers the authoritative power to manage the work done within those
organizations.
The authoritative power of customers makes it easier for them to sexu-
ally harass employees. In their work on the harassment of attorneys by cus-
tomers, Honigsberg, Tham, and Alexander noted that the power imbalance
between customers and workers is no less significant than the imbalance of
power between employers and employees, or co-workers and employees. In
their words, “[w]hen a client actually possesses or appears to possess the
power to influence the terms of an attorney’s employment, the client wields
similar power [to an employer]. . . .”237 In that study, the authors mention
that in cases of customer harassment, the employee may fear complaints
against her by the harassers, which could affect her status or job; she may
fear that failure to comply with the sexual demands of the customer might
result in revenge against the employer, which could be used against the
employee herself; and finally, she may fear that her employer will not take
action against the harasser.238 Additionally, in a study on female workers in
the sales sector, women noted they feel that sexual harassment is more about
power than sex, with men communicating to them “[y]ou’re lower than I
am and I can do this to you. . . .”239 Companies that rely on customer sales
may emphasize the demands of customer service as reason for sexual harass-
ment, but this also depends on the specific policies, practices, and proce-
dures of the organization, some of which require more tolerance of
customers from their workers, and others less. Gender exacerbates authority,
as do race and class differences, with studies showing that women from
racial minorities experience more incidents of sexual harassment in
234. Magnuson v. Peak Tech. Servs. Inc., 808 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Va. 1992). For the facts
and decision of this case, see infra at 155.
235. Magnuson, 808 F. Supp. at 505.
236. See Magnuson, 808 F. Supp. at 506; Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d
958, 968–69 (9th Cir. 2002); Go Kidz Go Ltd. v. Bourdouane, EAT/1110/95
(1996). See also Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1074 (10th Cir. 1998).
237. Honigsberg et al., supra note 10, at 728–29.
238. Id. at 732.
239. Loraine Anderson, Abuse From Another Corner, DETROIT FREE PRESS, May 26,
1982, at 1E-2E, in Vaughn, supra note 5, at 13.
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comparison to white women,240 and that women in low-wage occupations,
such as hotel maids and waitresses, experience extensive sexual
harassment.241
C. Service Market Power
The authoritative power of customers stemming from bureaucratic
power cannot be understood in isolation from service market power. When
Collins pointed to bureaucratic power as relevant to an understanding of
employee subordination, he noted that this power is parallel to market
power, which has been cited by Marx as the engine that subordinates the
working class.242 “Market power is the product of ownership of resources,
the potential transaction costs of utilising those resources, the costs of inac-
tion, and constraints established by prior commitments.”243 An employee’s
subordination is therefore understood on the basis of both market and au-
thoritative power, and both are highly relevant for understanding the legal
liability placed on employers regarding sexual harassment. In this sub-sec-
tion, I discuss the service market power of customers, which is a fundamen-
tal part of their domination.
Both consumption and production play key roles in service econo-
mies. Bryson, Daniels and Warf stress this point, arguing that consumption
and production cannot be separated.244 Seen in this way, customers’ con-
sumption becomes highly entwined within the process of work. This
entwinement, in turn, opens up a fuller understanding of the service market
power of customers, which is based on their consumption. A fundamental
aspect of the ability to consume—and the market’s reliance on such con-
sumption—is customers’ ownership of resources. Similar to the centrality of
market power in the understanding of employment relationships,245 and to
the theory of sexual harassment at work,246 customers’ service market power,
240. Gettman & Gelfand, supra note 8, at 763, 766. See also supra note 17 and accompa-
nying text.
241. Gettmann & Gelfand, supra note 8, at 763. See also supra notes 12 and 16.
242. Collins, supra note 220, at 2.
243. Id.
244. See discussion supra p. 145.
245. See generally GUY DAVIDOV, A PURPOSIVE APPROACH TO LABOUR LAW, 34–54
(Oxford Univ. Press 2016); Guy Davidov, The Three Axes of Employment Relation-
ships: A Characterization of Workers in Need of Protection, 52 U. TORONTO L. J. 357,
364 (2002).
246. Many feminist theories focus on forms of market power to discuss the placing of
liability on employers regarding sexual harassment at work. A central example is
MacKinnon’s work where she stresses that the major dynamic explaining sexual har-
assment at work includes the reciprocal enforcement of two inequalities: male sexual
domination and the employer’s control over workers. See supra discussion at 140–41.
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understood through their role as consumers, is crucially relevant for under-
standing customer domination. As owners of capital (whether small capital,
as when purchasing burgers at McDonalds, or huge capital), customers can
buy services and are thus perceived as assets to the employer and to the
business. Statistics show that service businesses lose approximately 10% of
their annual business volume because of inadequate service;247 this gives cus-
tomers immense power, and businesses will do almost anything to maintain
their relations with customers. Stories have been reported in which employ-
ees’ complaints against customers led those customers to take their business
elsewhere,248 while employers sought ways to avoid losing them.
Since service businesses are dependent on customers, employees must
toil to serve them. Countless stories tell of employees dismissed for failing to
serve their customers well. Carol Powell was dismissed for being rude to a
customer, even though her rudeness was a response to sexual harassment
and happened after three previous incidents of harassment had been re-
ported to her supervisors.249 The case of Little had the same outcome,250 as
did that of Go Kidz Go.251 McGinley noted in her research that employees
perceive Hard Rock’s attitude towards the sexual harassment of their em-
ployees to be “[i]f the employee can’t take it, there are applicants waiting in
line to deal at the Hard Rock.”252 Hard Rock’s former employees “per-
ceive[d] that the Hard Rock places its customer’s comfort over that of its
employees.”253 In the study of attorney harassment by customers, it was
found that “the attorney who is an employee may, when sexually harassed,
be more concerned about losing her job than the third-party client is con-
cerned about losing representation by the firm.”254
Acceptance of the centrality of customers to business—due to their
market power—is, I believe, one of the reasons why the law does not require
employers to revoke business relations with customers who have harassed
employees, or even to reprimand valued customers. Reliance on these cus-
247. Cliff Barbee & Valerie Bott, Customer Treatment as a Mirror of Employee Treatment,
56 S.A.M. ADVANCED MGMT. J. 27, 27 (1991).
248. See, e.g., Shirley Lung, Exploiting the Joint Employer Doctrine: Providing a Break for
Sweatshop Garment Workers, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 291, 292 (2003) (describing a
story of garment workers in the New York area who turned to two workers’ centers
to recover wages owed to them by their employer). The manufacturer, here the cus-
tomer, responded harshly and took his business to another factory. Id. The plant
closed, leaving seventy workers unemployed. See id.
249. Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024, 1025 (D. Nev. 1992).
250. Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 968 (9th Cir. 2002).
251. Go Kidz Go Ltd. v. Bourdouane, EAT/1110/95 (1996).
252. McGinley, Harassing Girls, supra note 43, at 1236.
253. Id.
254. Honigsberg, supra note 10, at 728.
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tomers shapes service practices and norms, such as the requirement that
employees provide service with a smile and fulfill customers’ demands, as
discussed above. Another case of the service market domination of custom-
ers appears in Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc.,255 where returning customers, who
later sexually harassed an employee named Rena Lockard, entered the res-
taurant. None of the servers wanted to wait on them due to their previous
bad behavior.256 Rena was asked to serve the customers.257 One of the cus-
tomers commented that she smelled good and asked what type of perfume
she was wearing.258 She responded that it was none of his business, and the
customer grabbed her by the hair.259 Rena reported this to her supervisor,
who replied “You wait on them. You were hired to be a waitress.”260 When
she continued serving, the customer grabbed her breasts and put his mouth
on them.261 Rena’s experiences emphasize the service market power of
customers.
A central service practice that reveals the service market power of cus-
tomers is the provision of tips. Tips are capital that customers control, and
employees need these tips for income, which leads them to act in ways that
preserve the service market power of customers, including their masculinity
and authority. In her study of restaurant workers, Kaitlyn Matulewicz dem-
onstrates how tip policy fuels a relationship of unequal power that leaves
workers vulnerable to sexual harassment and sexualized interactions with
customers “as the price to be paid for a tip,”262 something that constitutes,
in her words, “a form of institutionalized quid pro quo.”263 Amanda, one of
Matulewicz’s interviewees, is quoted as follows: “it doesn’t necessarily mean
that you’re okay with it. I’m okay with it, to a degree. I allow it to happen
because I—because of the money. It’d be nice to make that much money
without being treated like that. No one wants to be treated like that.”264
Such reliance on tips is also part of the general precariousness of the service
sector, which includes shift durations, employee schedules, and income in-
security.265 Hence, Matulewicz shows how work is organized “in a way that
constrains worker resistance to unwanted sexual attention and sexual harass-
ment, shaping an environment in which, over time, sexual conduct can
255. Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir. 1998).
256. Lockard, 162 F. 3d at 1067.
257. Lockard, 162 F. 3d at 1067.
258. Lockard, 162 F.3d at 1067.
259. Lockard, 162 F.3d at 1067.
260. Lockard, 162 F.3d at 1067.
261. Lockard, 162 F.3d at 1067.
262. Matulewicz, supra note 12, at 403.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 402.
265. Id. at 403.
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come to be thought of by women workers as a ‘normal’ and sometimes an
accepted feature of the work.”266
Elsewhere I have written:
Tip provision has two aspects. It is an act of generosity on the
part of the customer, but at the same time it constitutes a distri-
bution of employing functions to the customer. The clearest em-
ploying function is the payment for the work performed, but tip
provision impacts work relations in more subtle ways. As soon as
customers contribute to the worker’s earnings, they become in-
volved in the management of the employment relationship.
Workers adopt specific behaviors to please customers and fulfil
their wishes, not only for the benefit of the establishment owner
but also in the hope that, by responding to customer wishes,
their earnings will rise, a good word will be said to the employer,
etc. Once a worker is more dependent on a third party for earn-
ings, she becomes less loyal to her employer and more biased
towards the paying customer.267
Certainly, tipping is a source of customer power, which has been dis-
cussed at length in relation to other occupations apart from workers in res-
taurants. In the lap-dance sector, for example, tips have been shown to be a
reason that dancers perform certain acts.
Acts such as approaching clients, humoring them and making
them feel special have been documented as an essential part of
the work that keeps the money flowing. The method of payment
in the clubs also motivates dancers to increase their interaction
with clients in order to raise their pay. Once they have been
remunerated by one client they turn to another in the hope of
fulfilling his fantasy and opening his pocket.268
Because of their role in customers’ consumption, employees become
part of the service. The height, weight, looks, and attitudes of employees
have become part of the exchange, “as well as part of the reason why some
of them get hired and others do not. . . .”269 These decisions are made on
266. Id. at 403–04.
267. Albin, supra note 2, at 183–84.
268. Einat Albin, The Case of Quashie: Between the Legalisation of Sex Work and the Pre-
cariousness of Personal Service Work, 42 INDUS. L.J. 180, 185 (2013).
269. LINDA MCDOWELL, WORKING BODIES: INTERACTIVE SERVICE EMPLOYMENT AND
WORKPLACE IDENTITIES 9 (2009).
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the basis of customers’ service market power and the wish to fulfill their
demands, which are based on stereotypes of what the employee should look
like and provide, as well as on expectations of the particular service. Obvi-
ously, efforts to appeal to customers increase the probability of customer
sexual harassment. As the preceding analysis has shown, in cases of sexual
harassment by customers where dress codes and behaviors were sexualized,
employers were found to have constructed a hostile environment and were
held liable. However, the customers—who are fundamental elements of this
service market economy—are ignored. Their dominating power is not
acknowledged.
D. A Triangular Relationship
In all three aspects of customer domination at work, the internalized
and structural forms are intertwined and cannot be understood without
each other or without understanding the relationship as triangular. Mascu-
linity, authority and service-market power affect and exacerbate each other,
providing customers with significant power over employees. Additionally,
the power of customers, which parallels that of the employer, cannot be
understood outside of what has been termed in the literature as the em-
ployer-employee-customer triangular relationship. This triangular relation-
ship shapes the power dynamic among the three parties. In some
circumstances, it points to the employer’s construction of the work environ-
ment in a way that provides power to the customer. An excellent example of
this is McGinley’s study, which showed that by promoting a business on the
basis of a sexual image, employees are more exposed to sexual harassment by
customers;270 the image of the business is something that can be controlled
by the employer. Indeed, when determining and controlling the structure of
the workplace in a way that constructs customer domination, employers
should be required to provide more protection to their women employees,
as McGinley argued.271 But this is not only in sexualized industries. As the
discussion above reveals, such power can be constructed by employers’
transfer of their employer functions to customers, like hiring and firing de-
cisions and the payment of tips. Employers provide customers with power
through this payment method. In these circumstances, as well, employers
should be seen as more responsible to their women employees.
As the discussion above has also shown, customers benefit from the
power within the triangular relationship and exploit it. It provides them
with a sense of control over employees. Also, it seems as if the customer
allows himself to harass the employee because she is within a subordinated
270. McGinley Harassing Girls, supra note 43, at 1233.
271. McGinley, Sex(y) Workers, supra note 43, at 90–92.
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employment relationship with her employer, a situation that provides him
with an even greater dominating power over her. In contrast, when a worker
is self-employed, she can decide to end a relationship with a customer with-
out considering what her employer might think or do. Therefore, it is the
triangular relationship that increases customer domination at work, and
through it such domination can be better understood.
If one accepts the argument of the triangular relationship, then the
view of the customer as an external party is blurred. He is indeed external
according to the prevailing conception of the employment relationship, but,
in fact, his customer domination is built upon a triangular relationship that
brings him within the internal circle of the organization, albeit in a different
manner than supervisors or co-workers. It is important to recognize this
internal position of the customer if we want to think about a more appro-
priate approach to liability when customer domination is found—both with
respect to the employer and to the customer.
V. THE WAY FORWARD
Current legal frameworks do not comprehend customer domination at
work. This is not only problematic for the various reasons discussed above,
it also sustains the continuation of harm. From a feminist perspective, it
maintains stereotypes of women as sexual objects, enables the preservation
and even strengthening of structures leading to women’s economic disad-
vantages, permits physical and psychological personal injury to women, sup-
ports sexual segregation in the workplace,272 and causes other related harms
as described in feminist literature. Moreover, the prevailing paradigm,
which places liability on the employer for third-party harassment, does not
fit the true and actual experience of sexual harassment into a legal frame-
work, resulting in the perpetuation and escalation of silence and harm. This
is particularly true of the way the “reasonable accommodation” test is ap-
plied by the courts, through the accommodation of the victim (the em-
ployee) and not the harasser, thus intensifying stereotypes and economic
disadvantages, and even legitimizing the act of harassment because no simi-
lar harm is expected to affect the customer.
One way to address the situation discussed above is to require employ-
ers to be more responsible towards their women employees. When consider-
ing the role of employers in shaping customer domination at work,
employers should be required to shape their business in a way that limits
customer domination, and to take stricter steps against their customers in
272. Gillian K. Hadfield, Rational Women: A Test for Sex-Based Harassment, 83 CAL. L.
REV. 1151, 1169–70, 1967–80 (1995).
216 M I C H I G A N  J O U R N A L  O F  G E N D E R &  L A W [Vol. 24:167
retaliation for harassment, including ceasing business with them. Ending
business with the customer is more in line with the purpose of Title VII as
well as the doctrine of anti-discrimination. In some circumstances, ending
business is highly justified. Further, customer domination at work justifies, I
believe, broadening the scope of application to customers alongside em-
ployer liability. In this part of the Article, I offer two ways in which steps
can be taken to assign specific and rigid liability to customers. The first is by
placing specific responsibilities on dominating customers. The second is by
adopting a broad definition of “employer” that includes customers, using
the doctrine of joint employment.273
Title VII places liability on entities other than the employer for pro-
moting equality at work. These include employment agencies and labor or-
ganizations.274 Amending Title VII to include customers is desirable, I
believe, for dealing with customer domination at work. An additional way
of placing specific responsibilities on dominating customers is through state
law. Under some state laws, customers can be found to have tort or criminal
liability for the consequences of their sexual harassment. However, thus far,
there has been no recognition of customer domination at the state level,
because most state laws follow Title VII, which does not currently include
customers as potential liable entities. Once amendments are made as pro-
posed above, state laws might adopt a similar approach.
Placing specific obligations on dominating customers has various ad-
vantages. First, the main advantage is the recognition of the customer-em-
ployee relationship and of the possibility of customer domination over
employees within that relationship. Second, by placing liability under Title
VII and under state laws in parallel to employer liability, the employer is
not removed from the situation, and the responsibility of the customer can
be assessed in relation to that of the employer, thereby not distancing the
analysis from the triangular relationship. This will enable recognition of the
triangular relationship within which two parties create a setting that enables
the sexual harassment of employees. Jointly, and in a dynamic way, the two
parties shape a setting in which the employee becomes more vulnerable to
sexual harassment, and they also preserve their domination over her. Under
this proposal, both employer and customer are viewed as liable for work-
place harassment, and the courts can assess the power of both within the
273. This was previously suggested by David S. Warner, who offered this direction in
situations that he called “client-control,” i.e. when the employee was not working on
the grounds of the employer but rather on those of the customer, very much like the
case of Magnuson. See David S. Warner, Third Party Sexual Harassment in the Work-
place: An Examination of Client Control, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. L. J. 361, 371–73
(1995).
274. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b), (c) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-45).
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triangular relationship in any particular case. In some instances it might lead
to placing more severe liability on employers, in other cases, on customers,
and at times on both, depending on the circumstances.
Third, placing obligations on dominating customers within a frame-
work that considers all three parties will enable the courts, the legislatures,
the EEOC, and others to deal with the shortcomings of the prevailing para-
digm. These shortcomings include the placing of limited liability on em-
ployers, and the resulting legal problems—distortion from the theory of
equality, and the clearer understanding needed of the domination of cus-
tomers in work relationships. By seeing customers as integral to the work
relationship, employer liability will be viewed through a lens of “internal
causation” and will be stricter. In the same way, customer liability will be
assessed. Fourth, as opposed to the option of joint employment discussed
below, acknowledging customer domination enables the placing of responsi-
bility on individual customers who harass employees; it also places responsi-
bility on large firms, which can be seen as having vicarious liability when
their employees commit harassment.
In some circumstances, however, it might be useful to see customers as
employers under Title VII, when the legal tests point to them as such. This
is mainly applicable when there is close proximity between the customer
and the employee, and the customer is indeed very much like an employer
and therefore should not necessarily be distinguished. This is what hap-
pened in the case of Magnuson v. Peak Technical Services, Inc.,275 where the
Virginia District Court argued that the term “employer” in Title VII should
be interpreted broadly to also include situations of joint employment. In the
case, Rebecca Magnuson worked as a sales trainer for Lexus Motorcars and
as a consultant for Mercedes-Benz. She was hired and trained by Volk-
swagen, but her salary came from a company called Peak. Peak provided
employees to client corporations pursuant to service contracts.276 At some
point, Rebecca began working at a new assigned dealership, Fairfax Volk-
swagen. After a period of time, the general manager at Fairfax began sexu-
ally harassing her—meeting her in his office with the door closed, putting
his hand on her legs, and trying to pull her towards him, while also com-
menting on her body.277 He also asked her several times to leave work early
and check into a hotel room with him.278 Upon her refusal, he aimed to
sabotage her career, saying that he could provide either a favorable or a bad
report to her employer.279 Rebecca complained to her supervisors at Peak
275. Magnuson v. Peak Tech. Servs., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 500, 509 (E.D. Va. 1992).
276. Magnuson, 808 F. Supp. at 504.
277. Magnuson, 808 F. Supp. at 505.
278. Magnuson, 808 F. Supp. at 505.
279. Magnuson, 808 F. Supp. at 505.
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and at Volkswagen, asking to be assigned to another dealership. Her super-
visor told her she should “put up with it for the sake of Volkswagen.”280 She
was also told that this kind of harassment was normal given the male-domi-
nated nature of the auto industry. The harassment continued, and after
another refusal, Rebecca was called to her supervisor’s office who told her
that she no longer fit Volkswagen’s profile.281
Upon discussion, the District Court said that in drafting the legisla-
tion, “Congress left open the possibility that Title VII might apply beyond
the conventional single employer situation.”282 “[T]he term ‘employer’
under Title VII should be constructed in a functional sense to encompass
persons who are not employers in conventional terms, but who nevertheless
control some aspects of an individual’s compensation, terms, conditions or
privileges of employment.”283 Moreover, the court’s “conclusion finds sup-
port in the broad, remedial purpose of Title VII which militates against the
adoption of a rigid rule strictly limiting ‘employer’ status under Title VII to
an individual’s direct or single employer.”284 This is indeed a very suitable
case for seeing the customer as a joint employer.
One limitation of the proposal to view the customer and employer as
joint employers is the definition of “employer” in Title VII, which is as
follows: “a person engaged in industry affecting commerce who has fifteen
or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such per-
son.”285 Hence, only a customer who is working in an organization with
fifteen or more employees can be included within this definition. Another
limitation is that it misses the essence of the triangular relationship dis-
cussed above, which sees the customer as different from the employer.
Despite such limitations, in cases where there is close proximity, the
joint employment doctrine is justified. Joint employment has been used
quite widely in the U.S. in relation to the Fair Labor Standards Act and
280. Magnuson, 808 F. Supp. at 506.
281. Magnuson, 808 F. Supp. at 506.
282. Magnuson, 808 F. Supp. at 507.
283. Magnuson, 808 F. Supp. at 507–08 (quoting Bostick v. Rappleyea, 628 F. Supp
1328, 1334 (N.D.N.Y. 1985)).
284. Magnuson, 808 F. Supp. at 508.
285. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (West).
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other protective regulation286 and in cases of sexual harassment.287 The doc-
trine of joint employment is intended to cover situations where separate
entities “share or co-determine those matters governing the essential terms
and conditions of employment.”288 Shared employment has developed cen-
trally in situations of subcontracting under the idea that “manufacturers
ultimately determine the wages and conditions of . . . workers through con-
trol of the production process and economic domination of marginal con-
tractors.”289 Key to determining the existence of joint employment is the
economic realities test, which “consists of a multi-factor balancing analysis
that is based on the totality of the circumstances in which no single factor is
dispositive.”290 The courts, however, proclaim economic dependency as the
touchstone of that test.291 Nevertheless, as the Magnuson case discussed
above reveals, and as revealed by other recent cases where joint employment
has been recognized not on the basis of economic dependency but on other
control-related practices of customers,292 this does not seem to be a defini-
tive requirement.
Following both the proposal to adopt specific liability on customers
under Title VII or applying the joint employment doctrine suits the goal of
Title VII, which, as Vaughn has noted, has been—from the beginning—to
make victims whole and to eradicate discrimination in order to “eliminate
286. Guy Davidov, Joint Employer Status in Triangular Employment Relationships, 42 BRIT.
J. INDUS. REL. 727, 734–35 (2004); H. Lane Dennard, Jr. & Herbert R. Northrup,
Leased Employment: Character, Numbers, and Labour Law Problems, 28 GA. L. REV.
683 (1994); Robert B. Moberly & Robert J. Grammig, The United States, 36 BULL.
COMP. LAB. REL. 391 (1999).
287. See generally Magnuson, 808 F. Supp. at 509 (finding that manufacturer may be
considered a joint employer of a Volkswagen representative for purposes of Title
VII).
288. NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 691 F.2d 1117, 1123 (3rd Cir. 1982) (emphasis
omitted).
289. Lung, supra note 248, at 313.
290. Id. at 316.
291. Id.
292. One such example is the U.S. Supreme Court decision of Harris v. Quinn, where the
Court questioned whether an Illinois Act declaring that “personal assistants”—work-
ers funded by the state to provide in-home services to individuals whose conditions
would otherwise require institutionalization—are public employees solely for the
purpose of coverage under the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act infringes on the
First Amendment. 134 U.S. 2618, 2644 (2014). There, the Illinois policy was struc-
tured in a way that the Public Labor Relations Act applied to the workers and that
the State was paying their salaries, while the care recipients (the customers), deter-
mined the identity of the worker, the service plan, the course of training, and other
matters. Id. The majority opinion of the Court was that, due to their work pattern,
personal assistants were not, as the Court said, “full-fledged public employees” but
rather partial public employees, employed jointly by the State and the customers. Id..
at 2621.
220 M I C H I G A N  J O U R N A L  O F  G E N D E R &  L A W [Vol. 24:167
barriers” to equal employment opportunity.293 I argue that this can only be
achieved through the paradigm of customer domination at work.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Article challenged the prevailing legal paradigm regarding sexual
harassment of employees by third parties, which places liability on the em-
ployer following a binary view of the employment relationship. It showed
how the form of liability placed on employers is weaker in these situations
than in other instances where employers are liable for the sexual harassment
of their employees, not only in the U.S., but also in other legal systems
(Germany and Britain). Employers’ reliance on the customers’ business, and
employers’ legal obligations towards customers, preclude solutions such as
revoking the business relationship with the customer or even riling valued
customers. In some cases, this leads to an awkward legal approach in apply-
ing such liability. The Article thus offers a novel paradigm of customer domi-
nation at work, which is, I believe, not only more accurate in capturing the
reality of today’s work domain, but also deals more effectively with the
problems emerging from the prevailing paradigm. Customer domination at
work has three aspects:  masculinity, authority, and service-market power,
all of which are interconnected and impose domination within an em-
ployer-employee-customer triangular relationship. Customer domination is
shaped and reinforced within this triangular relationship and should lead to
the placing of stricter legal liability on employers, in addition to customers
bearing legal liability. While the first suggestion—stricter responsibilities on
employers—can be based on prevailing laws, the second is more problem-
atic. Two ways of achieving it have thus been proposed. The first is by
acknowledging a distinctive responsibility for customer domination in cases
of sexual harassment under Title VII, similar to acknowledgements that
have been made for employment agencies and labor organizations. This step
would also help place responsibility for customer domination under state
criminal and tort laws. The second is applying the joint employer doctrine
when there is close proximity between customers and employees. Only in
this way will we achieve the third wave of the sexual harassment revolution,
and the vision pushed by the drafters of Title VII—which aims to eliminate
barriers to equal employment opportunity. 
293. Vaughn, supra note 5, at 80 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
418 (1975)).
